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CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORPORATION; Norman Hahn; Norman Lemar 
Hahn; Anthony H. Hahn; Elizabeth Hahn; Kevin Hahn, Appellants 
v. 
SECRETARY OF the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES; Secretary United States Department of Labor; Secretary United States 
Department of the Treasury; United States Department of Health and Human Services; 
United States Department of Labor; United States Department of the Treasury. 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit 
Decided on July 26, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
COWEN, Circuit Judge 
Appellants Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corporation (“Conestoga”), Norman Hahn, 
Elizabeth Hahn, Norman Lemar Hahn, 
Anthony Hahn, and Kevin Hahn 
(collectively, “the Hahns”) appeal from an 
order of the District Court denying their 
motion for a preliminary injunction. In their 
Complaint, Appellants allege that 
regulations promulgated by the Department 
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), 
which require group health plans and health 
insurance issuers to provide coverage for 
contraceptives, violate the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”) and the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The District Court denied a 
preliminary injunction, concluding that 
Appellants were unlikely to succeed on the 
merits of their claims. Appellants then filed 
an expedited motion for a stay pending 
appeal with this Court, which was denied. 
Now, we consider the fully briefed appeal 
from the District Court's denial of a 
preliminary injunction. 
Before we can even reach the merits of the 
First Amendment and RFRA claims, we 
must consider a threshold issue: whether a 
for-profit, secular corporation is able to 
engage in religious exercise under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and 
the RFRA. As we conclude that for-profit, 
secular corporations cannot engage in 
religious exercise, we will affirm the order 
of the District Court. 
I. 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”). The ACA requires employers with 
fifty or more employees to provide their 
employees with a minimum level of health 
insurance. The ACA requires non-exempt 
group plans to provide coverage without 
cost-sharing for preventative care and 
screening for women in accordance with 
guidelines created by the Health Resources 
and Services Administration (“HRSA”), a 
subagency of HHS.  
The HRSA delegated the creation of 
guidelines on this issue to the Institute of 
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Medicine (“IOM”). The IOM recommended 
that the HRSA adopt guidelines that require 
non-exempt group plans to cover “[a]ll Food 
and Drug Administration approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and 
counseling for women with reproductive 
capacity.” These recommended guidelines 
were approved by the HRSA… Appellants 
refer to this requirement as the “Mandate,” 
and we use this term throughout this 
opinion. Employers who fail to comply with 
the Mandate face a penalty of $100 per day 
per offending employee. The Department of 
Labor and plan participants may also bring a 
suit against an employer that fails to comply 
with the Mandate.  
II. 
The Hahns own 100 percent of the voting 
shares of Conestoga. Conestoga is a 
Pennsylvania for-profit corporation that 
manufactures wood cabinets and has 950 
employees. The Hahns practice the 
Mennonite religion. According to their 
Amended Complaint, the Mennonite Church 
“teaches that taking of life which includes 
anything that terminates a fertilized embryo 
is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to 
which they are held accountable.” 
Specifically, the Hahns object to two drugs 
that must be provided by group health plans 
under the Mandate that “may cause the 
demise of an already conceived but not yet 
attached human embryo.” These are 
“emergency contraception” drugs such as 
Plan B (the “morning after pill”) and ella 
(the “week after pill”)… Conestoga has been 
subject to the Mandate as of January 1, 
2013, when its group health plan came up 
for renewal. As a panel of this Court 
previously denied an injunction pending 
appeal, Conestoga is currently subject to the 
Mandate, and in fact, Appellants' counsel 
represented during oral argument that 
Conestoga is currently complying with the 
Mandate. 
III. 
We review a district court's denial of a 
preliminary injunction for abuse of 
discretion, but review the underlying factual 
findings for clear error and questions of law 
de novo…  
 “A party seeking a preliminary injunction 
must show: (1) a likelihood of success on 
the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable 
harm if [] denied; (3) that granting 
preliminary relief will not result in even 
greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 
(4) that the public interest favors such 
relief.”… We will first consider whether 
Appellants are likely to succeed on the 
merits of their claim, beginning with the 
claims asserted by Conestoga, a for-profit, 
secular corporation. 
IV. 
A. 
First, we turn to Conestoga's claims under 
the First Amendment… The threshold 
question for this Court is whether 
Conestoga, a for-profit, secular corporation, 
can exercise religion. In essence, Appellants 
offer two theories under which we could 
conclude that Conestoga can exercise 
religion: (a) directly, under the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Citizens United, 
and (b) indirectly, under the “passed 
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through” method that has been articulated by 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
We will discuss each theory in turn. 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held 
that “the Government may not suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker's 
corporate identity,” and it accordingly struck 
down statutory restrictions on corporate 
independent expenditure. Citizens United 
recognizes the application of the First 
Amendment to corporations generally 
without distinguishing between the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause, 
both which are contained within the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, whether Citizens 
United is applicable to the Free Exercise 
Clause is a question of first impression.  
…In analyzing whether constitutional 
guarantees apply to corporations, the 
Supreme Court has held that certain 
guarantees are held by corporations and that 
certain guarantees are “purely personal” 
because “the ‘historic function’ of the 
particular guarantee has been limited to the 
protection of individuals.” The Bellotti 
Court observed: 
Corporate identity has been determinative 
in several decisions denying corporations 
certain constitutional rights, such as the 
privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, or equality with individuals 
in the enjoyment of a right to privacy, but 
this is not because the States are free to 
define the rights of their creatures without 
constitutional limit. Otherwise, 
corporations could be denied the 
protection of all constitutional guarantees, 
including due process and the equal 
protection of the laws…Whether or not a 
particular guarantee is “purely personal” 
or is unavailable to corporations for some 
other reason depends on the nature, 
history, and purpose of the particular 
constitutional provision. 
Thus, we must consider whether the Free 
Exercise Clause has historically protected 
corporations, or whether the “guarantee is 
‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to 
corporations” based on the “nature, history, 
and purpose of [this] particular 
constitutional provision.”  
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that it has “recognized that First 
Amendment protection extends to 
corporations.”… The Citizens United Court 
particularly relied on Bellotti, which struck 
down a state-law prohibition on corporate 
independent expenditures related to 
referenda issues… 
Discussing Bellotti's rationale, Citizens 
United stated that the case “rested on the 
principle that the Government lacks the 
power to ban corporations from speaking.” 
… 
We must consider the history of the Free 
Exercise Clause and determine whether 
there is a [] history of courts providing free 
exercise protection to corporations. We 
conclude that there is not. In fact, we are not 
aware of any case preceding the 
commencement of litigation about the 
Mandate, in which a for-profit, secular 
corporation was itself found to have free 
exercise rights. Such a total absence of 
caselaw takes on even greater significance 
when compared to the extensive list of 
Supreme Court cases addressing the free 
speech rights of corporations… 
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We are unable to determine that the “nature, 
history, and purpose” of the Free Exercise 
Clause supports the conclusion that for-
profit, secular corporations are protected 
under this particular constitutional 
provision. Even if we were to disregard the 
lack of historical recognition of the right, we 
simply cannot understand how a for-profit, 
secular corporation—apart from its 
owners—can exercise religion…  
In urging us to hold that for-profit, secular 
corporations can exercise religion, 
Appellants, as well as the dissent, cite to 
cases in which courts have ruled in favor of 
free exercise claims advanced by religious 
organizations. None of the cases relied on by 
the dissent involve secular, for-profit 
corporations. We will not draw the 
conclusion that, just because courts have 
recognized the free exercise rights of 
churches and other religious entities, it 
necessarily follows that for-profit, secular 
corporations can exercise religion…  
Appellants also argue that Citizens United is 
applicable to the Free Exercise Clause 
because “the authors of the First 
Amendment only separated the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause 
by a semi-colon, thus showing the 
continuation of intent between the two.” We 
are not persuaded that the use of a semi-
colon means that each clause of the First 
Amendment must be interpreted jointly. 
In fact, historically, each clause has been 
interpreted separately... 
Second, Appellants argue that Conestoga 
can exercise religion under a “passed 
through” theory, which was first developed 
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in EEOC v. Townley Engineering & 
Manufacturing Company, and affirmed in 
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky. In Townley and 
Stormans, the Ninth Circuit held that for-
profit corporations can assert the free 
exercise claims of their owners. 
In Townley, the plaintiff was a closely-held 
manufacturing company whose owners 
made a “covenant with God requir[ing] them 
to share the Gospel with all of their 
employees.” Townley, the plaintiff 
corporation, sought an exemption, on free 
exercise grounds, from a provision of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act that required it to 
accommodate employees asserting religious 
objections to attending the company's 
mandatory devotional services. Although the 
plaintiff urged the “court to hold that it is 
entitled to invoke the Free Exercise Clause 
on its own behalf,” the Ninth Circuit deemed 
it “unnecessary to address the abstract issue 
whether a for profit corporation has rights 
under the Free Exercise Clause independent 
of those of its shareholders and officers.” 
Rather, the court concluded that, “Townley 
is merely the instrument through and by 
which Mr. and Mrs. Townley express their 
religious beliefs.” As “Townley presents no 
rights of its own different from or greater 
than its owners' rights,” the Ninth Circuit 
held that “the rights at issue are those of 
Jake and Helen Townley.” The court then 
examined the rights at issue as those of the 
corporation's owners, ultimately concluding 
that Title VII's requirement of religious 
accommodation did not violate the 
Townleys' free exercise rights.  
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The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied 
Townley's reasoning in Stormans. There, a 
pharmacy brought a Free Exercise Clause 
challenge to a state regulation requiring it to 
dispense Plan B, an emergency 
contraceptive drug. In analyzing whether the 
pharmacy had standing to assert the free 
exercise rights of its owners, the court 
emphasized that the pharmacy was a 
“fourth-generation, family-owned business 
whose shareholders and directors are made 
up entirely of members of the Stormans 
family.” As in Townley, it “decline[d] to 
decide whether a for-profit corporation can 
assert its own rights under the Free Exercise 
Clause and instead examine[d] the rights at 
issue as those of the corporate owners.”…  
Appellants argue that Conestoga is 
permitted to assert the free exercise claims 
of the Hahns, its owners, under the 
Townley/Stormans “passed through” theory. 
After carefully considering the Ninth 
Circuit's reasoning, we are not persuaded. 
We decline to adopt the Townley/Stormans 
theory, as we believe that it rests on 
erroneous assumptions regarding the very 
nature of the corporate form. In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit did not mention certain basic 
legal principles governing the status of a 
corporation and its relationship with the 
individuals who create and own the entity. It 
is a fundamental principle that 
“incorporation's basic purpose is to create a 
distinct legal entity, with legal rights, 
obligations, powers, and privileges different 
from those of the natural individuals who 
created” the corporation. The “passed 
through” doctrine fails to acknowledge that, 
by incorporating their business, the Hahns 
themselves created a distinct legal entity that 
has legally distinct rights and 
responsibilities from the Hahns, as the 
owners of the corporation… Thus, under 
Pennsylvania law—where Conestoga is 
incorporated—“[e]ven when a corporation is 
owned by one person or family, the 
corporate form shields the individual 
members of the corporation from personal 
liability.”  
Since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns, 
the Mandate does not actually require the 
Hahns to do anything. All responsibility for 
complying with the Mandate falls on 
Conestoga… [I]t is Conestoga that must 
provide the funds to comply with the 
Mandate—not the Hahns. We recognize 
that, as the sole shareholders of Conestoga, 
ultimately the corporation's profits will flow 
to the Hahns… “The fact that one person 
owns all of the stock does not make him and 
the corporation one and the same person, nor 
does he thereby become the owner of all the 
property of the corporation.” The Hahn 
family chose to incorporate and conduct 
business through Conestoga, thereby 
obtaining both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the corporate form. We 
simply cannot ignore the distinction between 
Conestoga and the Hahns. We hold—
contrary to Townley and Stormans—that the 
free exercise claims of a company's owners 
cannot “pass through” to the corporation. 
B. 
Next, we consider Conestoga's RFRA claim. 
Under the RFRA, “[g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person's exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability [unless the 
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burden] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.” As with 
the inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause, 
our preliminary inquiry is whether a for-
profit, secular corporation can assert a claim 
under the RFRA. Under the plain language 
of the statute, the RFRA only applies to a 
“person's exercise of religion.” 
Our conclusion that a for-profit, secular 
corporation cannot assert a claim under the 
Free Exercise Clause necessitates the 
conclusion that a for-profit, secular 
corporation cannot engage in the exercise of 
religion. Since Conestoga cannot exercise 
religion, it cannot assert a RFRA claim. We 
thus need not decide whether such a 
corporation is a “person” under the RFRA. 
V. 
Finally, we consider whether the Hahns, as 
the owners of Conestoga, have viable Free 
Exercise Clause and RFRA claims on their 
own. For the same reasons that we 
concluded that the Hahns' claims cannot 
“pass through” Conestoga, we hold that the 
Hahns do not have viable claims…  
Thus, we conclude that the Hahns are not 
likely to succeed on their free exercise and 
RFRA claims. 
VI. 
As Appellants have failed to show that they 
are likely to succeed on the merits of their 
Free Exercise Clause and RFRA claims, we 
need not decide whether Appellants have 
shown that they will suffer irreparable harm, 
that granting preliminary relief will not 
result in even greater harm to the 
Government, and that the public interest 
favors the relief of a preliminary injunction. 
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's 
order denying Appellants' motion for a 
preliminary injunction. 
We recognize the fundamental importance 
of the free exercise of religion. As Congress 
stated, in passing the RFRA and restoring 
the compelling interest test to laws that 
substantially burden religion, “the framers of 
the Constitution, recognizing free exercise 
of religion as an unalienable right, secured 
its protection in the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.” Thus, our decision here is in 
no way intended to marginalize the Hahns' 
commitment to the Mennonite faith. We 
accept that the Hahns sincerely believe that 
the termination of a fertilized embryo 
constitutes an “intrinsic evil and a sin 
against God to which they are held 
accountable,” and that it would be a sin to 
pay for or contribute to the use of 
contraceptives which may have such a 
result. We simply conclude that the law has 
long recognized the distinction between the 
owners of a corporation and the corporation 
itself. A holding to the contrary—that a for-
profit corporation can engage in religious 
exercise—would eviscerate the fundamental 
principle that a corporation is a legally 
distinct entity from its owners. 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
Having previously dissented from the denial 
of a stay pending appeal in this case, I now 
have a second opportunity to consider the 
government's violation of the religious 
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freedoms of Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corporation (“Conestoga”) and its owners, 
the Hahns, a family of devout Mennonite 
Christians who believe in the sanctity of 
human life… My colleagues, at the 
government's urging, are willing to say that 
the Hahns' choice to operate their business 
as a corporation carries with it the 
consequence that their rights of conscience 
are forfeit. 
That deeply disappointing ruling rests on a 
cramped and confused understanding of the 
religious rights preserved by Congressional 
action and the Constitution… I do not 
believe my colleagues or the District Court 
judge whose opinion we are reviewing are 
ill-motivated in the least, but the outcome of 
their shared reasoning is genuinely tragic, 
and one need not have looked past the first 
row of the gallery during the oral argument 
of this appeal, where the Hahns were seated 
and listening intently, to see the real human 
suffering occasioned by the government's 
determination to either make the Hahns bury 
their religious scruples or watch while their 
business gets buried. So, as I did the last 
time this case was before us, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I. Background 
Five members of the Hahn family—
Norman, Elizabeth, Norman Lemar, 
Anthony, and Kevin—own 100 percent of 
Conestoga, which Norman founded nearly 
fifty years… The Hahns are hands-on 
owners. They manage their business and try 
to turn a profit, with the help of Conestoga's 
950 full-time employees… They feel bound, 
as the District Court observed, “to operate 
Conestoga in accordance with their religious 
beliefs and moral principles.” One 
manifestation of that commitment is the 
“Statement on the Sanctity of Human 
Life.”…  
Accordingly, the Hahns believe that 
facilitating the use of contraceptives, 
especially ones that destroy a fertilized 
ovum, is a violation of their core religious 
beliefs. Conestoga, at the Hahns' direction, 
had previously provided health insurance 
that omitted coverage for contraception. 
Then came the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”) and 
related regulations… Under rules [] 
corporations like Conestoga must purchase 
employee health insurance plans that include 
coverage for “[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration [ (“FDA”) ] approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and 
counseling.”… This is what has been 
dubbed the “contraception mandate” (the 
“Mandate”), and it brooks no exception for 
those, like the Appellants, who believe that 
supporting the use of certain contraceptives 
is morally reprehensible and contrary to 
God's word. If the Hahns fail to have 
Conestoga submit to the offending 
regulations, the company will be subject to a 
“regulatory tax”—a penalty or fine—that 
will amount to about $95,000 per day and 
will rapidly destroy the business and the 950 
jobs that go with it… 
II. Standard of Review 
To qualify for preliminary injunctive relief, 
a litigant must demonstrate “(1) a likelihood 
of success on the merits; (2) that it will 
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suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is 
denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief 
will not result in even greater harm to the 
nonmoving party; and (4) that the public 
interest favors such relief.” “We review the 
denial of a preliminary injunction for an 
abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a 
clear mistake in the consideration of proof,” 
and “any determination that is a prerequisite 
to the issuance of an injunction is reviewed 
according to the standard applicable to that 
particular determination.”… Highly relevant 
to this case, “a court of appeals must reverse 
if the district court has proceeded on the 
basis of an erroneous view of the applicable 
law.” 
The Majority gives short shrift to the dispute 
over the standard of review that emerged 
during the earlier appeal in this case. My 
colleagues say simply that “[a] plaintiff's 
failure to establish any element in its favor 
renders a preliminary injunction 
inappropriate.” That may be true, but it fails 
to address the problem that arose from the 
District Court's erroneous application of a 
more rigid standard than our case law 
requires…  
It is true that we have not used the label 
“sliding scale” to describe our standard for 
preliminary injunctions, as numerous other 
circuit courts of appeals have. But we have 
said that, “in a situation where factors of 
irreparable harm, interests of third parties 
and public considerations strongly favor the 
moving party, an injunction might be 
appropriate even though plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate as strong a likelihood of 
ultimate success as would generally be 
required.”… The Court thus erred, and we 
should say so. 
Unlike the Majority, which tacitly endorses 
the District Court's application of an 
incorrect and unduly restrictive standard of 
review, I would apply the standard 
mandated by our own case law and used in 
the vast majority of our sister circuits. 
III. Discussion 
The Majority, like the District Court, 
evaluates only one of the four preliminary 
injunction factors: the likelihood of the 
Hahns' and Conestoga's success on the 
merits. Holding that the “Appellants have 
failed to show that they are likely to succeed 
on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause 
and RFRA claims,” the Majority “[does] not 
decide whether Appellants have shown that 
they will suffer irreparable harm, that 
granting preliminary relief will not result in 
even greater harm to the Government, [or] 
that the public interest favors the relief of a 
preliminary injunction.” My colleagues 
thereby avoid addressing, let alone 
weighing, the additional factors. I believe 
that they are wrong about the likelihood of 
success that both the Hahns and Conestoga 
should be credited with, and I am further 
persuaded that the remaining three factors, 
particularly the showing of irreparable harm, 
weigh overwhelmingly in favor of relief… 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
This case is one of many filed against the 
government in recent months by for-profit 
corporations and their owners seeking 
protection from the Mandate. So far, most of 
those cases have reached the preliminary 
 38 
injunction stage only, and a clear majority of 
courts has determined that temporary 
injunctive relief is in order. I join that 
consensus, and note also the recent en banc 
decision of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit holding that 
two for-profit companies had “established 
[that] they are likely to succeed on their 
RFRA claim” and that the Mandate 
threatened them with irreparable harm. 
…“[L]ikelihood of success” means that a 
plaintiff has “a reasonable chance, or 
probability, of winning.”… In the sense 
pertinent here, the term “likelihood” 
embodies “[t]he quality of offering a 
prospect of success,” or showing some 
promise. The Appellants have shown the 
requisite prospect of success. 
1. Conestoga's Right to Assert RFRA and 
First Amendment Claims 
I begin where the Majority begins and ends, 
with the issue of Conestoga's claim to 
religious liberty…   
The Majority declares that there is no 
“history of courts providing free exercise 
protection to corporations.” As my 
colleagues see it, “ ‘[r]eligious belief takes 
shape within the minds and hearts of 
individuals, and its protection is one of the 
more uniquely human rights provided by the 
Constitution’ ” so religion must be “an 
inherently ‘human’ right” that cannot be 
exercised by a corporation like Conestoga. 
That reasoning fails for several reasons. 
First, to the extent it depends on the 
assertion that collective entities, including 
corporations, have no religious rights, it is 
plainly wrong, as numerous Supreme Court 
decisions have recognized the right of 
corporations to enjoy the free exercise of 
religion… 
The Majority slips away from its own 
distinction between for-profit and non-profit 
entities when it tries to support its holding 
with a citation to the Supreme Court's 
observation that the Free Exercise Clause “ 
‘secure[s] religious liberty in the individual 
by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil 
authority.’ ” If that out-of-context clause 
really meant, as the Majority argues, that the 
right was limited to individuals, then all 
groups would be left in the cold, not just for-
profit corporations. But that is manifestly 
not what the quoted language means… 
Religious opinions and faith are in this 
respect akin to political opinions and 
passions, which are held and exercised both 
individually and collectively…. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has specifically “rejected the 
argument that political speech of 
corporations or other associations should be 
treated differently under the First 
Amendment simply because such 
associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ” It 
thus does nothing to advance the discussion 
to say that the Free Exercise Clause secures 
religious liberty to individuals. Of course it 
does. That does not mean that associations 
of individuals, including corporations, lack 
free exercise rights. 
I am not suggesting that corporations enjoy 
all of the same constitutionally grounded 
rights as individuals do….  
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Contrary to the Majority's conclusion, there 
is nothing about the “nature, history, and 
purpose” of religious exercise that limits it 
to individuals. Quite the opposite; believers 
have from time immemorial sought strength 
in numbers. They lift one another's faith and, 
through their combined efforts, increase 
their capacity to meet the demands of their 
doctrine. The use of the word 
“congregation” for religious groups 
developed for a reason…  
As the government and the Majority see it, 
religious rights are more limited than other 
kinds of First Amendment rights. All groups 
can enjoy secular free expression and rights 
to assembly, but only “religious 
organizations” have a right to religious 
liberty. Of course, that view leaves it to the 
government to decide what qualifies as a 
“religious organization,” which ought to 
give people serious pause since one of the 
central purposes of the First Amendment is 
to keep the government out of the sphere of 
religion entirely.  
Assuming, however, that the government 
had the competence to decide who is 
religious enough to qualify as a “religious 
organization,” there is no reason to suppose 
that the Free Exercise guarantee is as limited 
as the government claims or the Majority 
accepts. Our Constitution recognizes the free 
exercise of religion as something in addition 
to other kinds of expression, not because it 
requires less deference, but arguably 
because it requires more. At the very least, it 
stands on an equal footing with the other 
protections of the First Amendment. The 
values protected by the religious freedom 
clauses of the First Amendment “have been 
zealously protected, sometimes even at the 
expense of other interests of admittedly high 
social importance.”…  
But even if it were appropriate to ignore the 
Supreme Court's advice and focus on the 
person asserting the right rather than on the 
right at stake, there is a blindness to the idea 
that an organization like a closely held 
corporation is something other than the 
united voices of its individual members. The 
Majority detects no irony in its adoption of 
the District Court's comment that “ 
‘[r]eligious belief takes shape within the 
minds and hearts of individuals, and its 
protection is one of the more uniquely 
human rights provided by the Constitution’ ” 
while it is simultaneously denying religious 
liberty to Conestoga, an entity that is 
nothing more than the common vision of 
five individuals from one family who are of 
one heart and mind about their religious 
belief. Acknowledging “the Hahns' 
commitment to the Mennonite faith” on one 
hand, while on the other acting as if the 
Hahns do not even exist and are not having 
their “uniquely human rights” trampled on is 
more than a little jarring. 
And what is the rationale for this “I can't see 
you” analysis? It is that for-profit 
corporations like Conestoga were “created 
to make money.” It is the profit-making 
character of the corporation, not the 
corporate form itself, that the Majority treats 
as decisively disqualifying Conestoga from 
seeking the protections of the First 
Amendment or RFRA. That argument treats 
the line between profit-motivated and non-
profit entities as much brighter than it 
actually is, since for-profit corporations 
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pursue non-profit goals on a regular basis. 
More important for present purposes, 
however, the kind of distinction the majority 
draws between for-profit corporations and 
non-profit corporations has been considered 
and expressly rejected in other First 
Amendment cases… 
The forceful dissent of Judge John T. 
Noonan, Jr., in EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & 
Mfg. Co., put the point plainly: 
The First Amendment, guaranteeing the 
free exercise of religion to every person 
within the nation, is a guarantee that 
[for-profit corporations may] rightly 
invoke[ ]. Nothing in the broad sweep of 
the amendment puts corporations outside 
its scope. Repeatedly and successfully, 
corporations have appealed to the 
protection the Religious Clauses afford 
or authorize. Just as a corporation enjoys 
the right of free speech guaranteed by 
the First Amendment, so a corporation 
enjoys the right guaranteed by the First 
Amendment to exercise religion. 
The First Amendment does not say that 
only one kind of corporation enjoys this 
right. The First Amendment does not say 
that only religious corporations or only 
not-for-profit corporations are protected. 
The First Amendment does not authorize 
Congress to pick and choose the persons 
or the entities or the organizational 
forms that are free to exercise their 
religion. All persons—and under our 
Constitution all corporations are 
persons—are free. A statute cannot 
subtract from their freedom. 
Oddly, the government's opposing view, 
adopted by the Majority, appears to be itself 
a species of religion, based on the idea that 
seeking after filthy lucre is sin enough to 
deprive one of constitutional protection, and 
taking “[t]he theological position ... that 
human beings should worship God on 
Sundays or some other chosen day and go 
about their business without reference to 
God the rest of the time.” There is certainly 
in the text of the Constitution no support for 
this peculiar doctrine, and what precedent 
there is on the role of religion in the world 
of commerce is to the contrary. As the Tenth 
Circuit sitting en banc noted in Hobby 
Lobby, the Supreme Court's decisions 
establish that Free Exercise rights do not 
evaporate when one is involved in a for-
profit business.  
So, to recap, it is not the corporate form 
itself that can justify discriminating against 
Conestoga, and it is not the pursuit of profits 
that can justify it. Yet somehow, by the 
miracle-math employed by HHS and its 
lawyers, those two negatives add up to a 
positive right in the government to 
discriminate against a for-profit corporation. 
Thus, despite the Supreme Court's insistence 
that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
or act their faith therein,” the government 
claims the right to force Conestoga and its 
owners to facilitate the purchase and use of 
contraceptive drugs and devices, including 
abortifacients, all the while telling them that 
they do not even have a basis to speak up in 
opposition. Remarkable. 
I reject that power grab and would hold that 
Conestoga may invoke the right to religious 
liberty on its own behalf. 
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2. The Appellants' RFRA Claim 
Turning to the merits of the Appellants' 
RFRA claim, I am satisfied that both 
Conestoga and the Hahns have shown a 
likelihood of success. RFRA has been called 
the “most important congressional action 
with respect to religion since the First 
Congress proposed the First Amendment,” 
and it exists specifically to provide 
heightened protection to the free exercise of 
religion…  
In short, RFRA restores the judicial standard 
of review known as “strict scrutiny,” which 
is “the most demanding test known to 
constitutional law.” The statute prohibits the 
Federal government from “substantially 
burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability,” except when the 
government can “demonstrat[e] that 
application of the burden to the person—(1) 
is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.” The 
term “exercise of religion” “includes any 
exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.” A person whose religious 
practices are burdened in violation of RFRA 
“may assert that violation as a claim or 
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain 
appropriate relief.”  
a. Substantial Burden 
Under RFRA, “a rule imposes a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion if it 
prohibits a practice that is both sincerely 
held by and rooted in the religious beliefs of 
the party asserting the claim.” Within the 
related context of the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, a 
“substantial burden” exists where: (1) “a 
follower is forced to choose between 
following the precepts of his religion and 
forfeiting benefits otherwise generally 
available to other [persons] versus 
abandoning one of the precepts of his 
religion in order to receive a benefit”; or (2) 
“the government puts substantial pressure on 
an adherent to substantially modify his 
behavior and to violate his beliefs.”  
The substantial burden test derives from the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Sherbert and 
Yoder. In Sherbert, the Court held that a 
state's denial of unemployment benefits to a 
Seventh–Day Adventist for refusing to work 
on Saturdays substantially burdened the 
exercise of her religious belief against 
working on Saturdays…  
And in Yoder the Court held that a 
compulsory school attendance law 
substantially burdened the religious exercise 
of Amish parents who refused to send their 
children to high school. The burden in Yoder 
was a fine of between five and fifty dollars. 
The Court held that burden to be “not only 
severe, but inescapable,” requiring the 
parents “to perform acts undeniably at odds 
with fundamental tenets of their religious 
belief.”  
The District Court here failed to appreciate 
the applicability of those precedents. It held, 
for two reasons, that the burden imposed by 
the Mandate on Conestoga and the Hahns 
was insubstantial. First, it said that 
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Conestoga, as a for-profit corporation, lacks 
religious rights and so can suffer no burden 
on them, and, relatedly, that any harm to the 
Hahns' religious liberty is “too attenuated to 
be substantial” because it is Conestoga, not 
they, that must face the Mandate. That line 
of argument is fallacious, for the reasons I 
have just discussed and will not repeat.  
Relying on the recently reversed panel 
decision in Hobby Lobby, the District 
Court's second line of argument was that 
“the Hahns have not demonstrated that [the 
Mandate] constitute[s] a substantial burden 
upon their religion,” because “the ultimate 
and deeply private choice to use an 
abortifacient contraceptive rests not with the 
Hahns, but with Conestoga's employees.” As 
the District Court saw it, “any burden 
imposed by the regulations is too attenuated 
to be considered substantial” because “[a] 
series of events must first occur before the 
actual use of an abortifacient would come 
into play,” including that “the payment for 
insurance [must be made] to a group health 
insurance plan that will cover contraceptive 
services ...; the abortifacients must be made 
available to Conestoga employees through a 
pharmacy or other healthcare facility; and a 
decision must be made by a Conestoga 
employee and her doctor, who may or may 
not choose to avail themselves to these 
services.” “Such an indirect and attenuated 
relationship,” the Court held, “appears 
unlikely to establish the necessary 
substantial burden.”  
The problem with that reasoning is that it 
fundamentally misapprehends the substance 
of the Hahns' claim. As the Seventh Circuit 
rightly pointed out when granting an 
injunction in the Mandate case before it, 
“[t]he religious-liberty violation at issue 
here inheres in the coerced coverage of 
contraception, abortifacients, sterilization, 
and related services, not—or perhaps more 
precisely, not only—in the later purchase or 
use of contraception or related services.” In 
requiring them to provide the offending 
insurance coverage, the Mandate requires 
the Hahns and Conestoga to take direct 
actions that violate the tenets of their 
Mennonite faith, with the threat of severe 
penalties for non-compliance…  
Even if Conestoga's and the Hahns' only 
religious objection were the ultimate use of 
the offending contraceptives by Conestoga 
employees, however, the fact that the final 
decision on use involves a series of sub-
decisions does not render the burden on their 
religious exercise insubstantial. Nothing in 
RFRA suggests that indirect pressure cannot 
violate the statute. Indeed, even though a 
burden may be characterized as “indirect,” 
“the Supreme Court has indicated that 
indirectness is not a barrier to finding a 
substantial burden.” The claimant in Thomas 
v. Review Board of Indiana Employment 
Security Division, quit his job because, 
based on his religious beliefs, he could not 
work in a factory that produced tank turrets. 
The state denied him unemployment 
benefits and argued that his objection was 
unfounded because he had been willing to 
work in a different factory that produced 
materials that might be used for tanks. The 
Supreme Court held that, in determining 
whether Thomas's religious beliefs were 
burdened, it could not second-guess his 
judgment about what connection to 
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armament production was unacceptably 
close for him… 
Moreover, if the indirectness of the ultimate 
decision to use contraceptives truly rendered 
insubstantial the harm to an employer, then 
no exemptions to the Mandate would be 
necessary... 
It is true, as the Supreme Court cautioned in 
United States v. Lee, that “every person 
cannot be shielded from all the burdens 
incident to exercising every aspect of the 
right to practice religious beliefs… [T]he 
Court held that the requirement to pay 
Social Security taxes substantially burdened 
a for-profit Amish employer's religious 
exercise…  
Thus, I would hold that the District Court 
erred in concluding that the Mandate does 
not substantially burden Conestoga's and the 
Hahns' free exercise of religion. 
b. Strict Scrutiny 
If government action “substantially burdens” 
religious exercise, it will be upheld under 
RFRA only if it “is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest,” and “is 
the least restrictive means” of accomplishing 
that interest. Neither the Majority nor the 
District Court addressed that strict scrutiny 
test, because they disposed of the case on 
other grounds… Only the feeblest 
application of strict scrutiny could result in 
upholding the Mandate on this record. 
i. Compelling Interest 
Compelling interests are those “of the 
highest order” or “paramount interests.” The 
government maintains that the Mandate 
advances two compelling governmental 
interests: “public health and gender 
equality.”…  
Preserving public health and ending gender 
discrimination are indeed of tremendous 
societal significance. The government can 
certainly claim “a compelling interest in 
safeguarding the public health by regulating 
the health care and insurance markets.”…  
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the 
Mandate may actually advance those 
interests, it must nevertheless be observed 
that the mere “invocation” of a “general 
interest in promoting public health and 
safety [or, for that matter, gender equality] 
... is not enough” under RFRA. The 
government must show that the application 
of the Mandate to the Hahns and Conestoga 
in particular furthers those compelling 
interests…  
The government's arguments against 
accommodating the Hahns and Conestoga 
are “undermined by the existence of 
numerous exemptions [it has already made] 
to the ... mandate.” By its own choice, the 
government has exempted an enormous 
number of employers from the Mandate, 
including “religious employers” who appear 
to share the same religious objection as 
Conestoga and the Hahns, leaving tens of 
millions of employees and their families 
untouched by it… So, when the 
government's proffered compelling interest 
applies equally to employers subject to a law 
and those exempt from it, “it is difficult to 
see how [the] same findings [supporting the 
government's interest] alone can preclude 
 44 
any consideration of a similar exception” for 
a similarly situated plaintiff…  
ii. Least Restrictive Means 
Nor can the government affirmatively 
establish that the Mandate is the least 
restrictive means of advancing its interests 
in health and gender equality. Statutes fail 
the “least restrictive means” test when they 
are “overbroad” or “underinclusive.” The 
underinclusiveness here is manifest, as just 
described…  
The Hahns and Conestoga argue that the 
government could directly further its interest 
in providing greater access to contraception 
without violating their religious exercise…  
In response, the government argues that the 
Appellants misunderstand the least-
restrictive-means test and that their proposed 
alternatives “would require federal taxpayers 
to pay the cost of contraceptive services for 
the employees of for-profit, secular 
companies.”  
It is the government that evidently 
misunderstands the test, for while the 
government need not address every 
conceivable alternative, it “must refute the 
alternative schemes offered by the 
challenger,” ultimately settling on a policy 
that is “necessary” to achieving its 
compelling goals. And it must seek out 
religiously neutral alternatives before 
choosing policies that impinge on religious 
liberty. In those responsibilities, the 
government has utterly failed… Because the 
government has not refuted that it could 
satisfy its interests in the wider distribution 
of contraception through any or all of the 
means suggested by Conestoga and the 
Hahns, without burdening their rights to 
religious liberty, the government has not 
shown that the Mandate is the least 
restrictive means of addressing those 
interests… 
Accordingly, the government has not met 
the burdens of strict scrutiny, and I would 
hold that Conestoga and the Hahns have 
established a likelihood of succeeding on the 
merits of their RFRA claim. 
3. The Appellants' First Amendment 
Claim 
Conestoga and the Hahns also bring a 
separate claim under the First Amendment. 
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court 
in Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause 
is not implicated when the government 
burdens a person's religious exercise through 
laws that are neutral and generally 
applicable…  
In my view, the Mandate is not generally 
applicable, and it is not neutral. “A law fails 
the general applicability requirement if it 
burdens a category of religiously motivated 
conduct but exempts or does not reach a 
substantial category of conduct that is not 
religiously motivated and that undermines 
the purposes of the law to at least the same 
degree as the covered conduct that is 
religiously motivated.” Here, as already 
noted, the government has provided 
numerous exemptions, large categories of 
which are unrelated to religious 
objections… And it seems less than neutral 
to say that some religiously motivated 
employers—the ones picked by the 
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government—are exempt while others are 
not… Under the First Amendment, 
therefore, the Mandate is to be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. As discussed above in 
relation to the RFRA claim brought by 
Conestoga and the Hahns, the Mandate does 
not pass that daunting test, and, accordingly, 
they have demonstrated a reasonable 
likelihood of succeeding on their First 
Amendment claim. 
B. Irreparable Harm 
Focusing only on the question of likelihood 
of success on the merits, neither the District 
Court nor the Majority evaluated whether 
Conestoga and the Hahns have demonstrated 
irreparable harm…  
“Irreparable harm is injury for which a 
monetary award cannot be adequate 
compensation.”… Threats to First 
Amendment rights are often seen as so 
potentially harmful that they justify a lower 
threshold of proof to show a likelihood of 
success on the merits.  
Because the government demanded that the 
Hahns and Conestoga capitulate before their 
appeal was even heard, and because the 
District Court denied preliminary injunctive 
relief, the severe hardship has begun. Faced 
with ruinous fines, the Hahns and Conestoga 
are being forced to pay for the offending 
contraceptives, including abortifacients, in 
violation of their religious convictions, and 
every day that passes under those conditions 
is a day in which irreparable harm is 
inflicted…  
C. The Remaining Injunction Factors 
Conestoga and the Hahns have also met the 
remaining preliminary injunction factors. A 
preliminary injunction would not result in 
greater harm to the government but would 
merely restore the status quo between the 
parties…. [T]he harm to Conestoga and the 
Hahns caused by the denial of the 
preliminary injunction vastly outweighs the 
harm to the government were an injunction 
to be granted… Although a preliminary 
injunction in this case might “temporarily 
interfere[ ] with the government's goal of 
increasing cost-free access to contraception 
and sterilization,” that interest “is 
outweighed by the harm to the substantial 
religious-liberty interests on the other side.”  
In addition, a preliminary injunction would 
not harm the public interest… An injunction 
would simply put Conestoga's employees in 
the same position as the tens of millions of 
employees and their families whose 
employers have already been exempted from 
the Mandate. 
IV. Conclusion 
This is a controversial […] but in the final 
analysis it should not be hard for us to join 
the many courts across the country that have 
looked at the Mandate and concluded that 
the government should be enjoined from 
telling sincere believers in the sanctity of 
life to put their consciences aside and 
support other people's reproductive choices. 
The District Court's ruling should be 
reversed and a preliminary injunction should 
issue. 
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TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge 
This case requires us to determine whether 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and 
the Free Exercise Clause protect the 
plaintiffs—two companies and their owners 
who run their businesses to reflect their 
religious values. The companies are Hobby 
Lobby, a craft store chain, and Mardel, a 
Christian bookstore chain. Their owners, the 
Greens, run both companies as closely held 
family businesses and operate them 
according to a set of Christian principles. 
They contend regulations implementing the 
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act force them to violate their sincerely held 
religious beliefs. In particular, the plaintiffs 
brought an action challenging a regulation 
that requires them, beginning July 1, 2013, 
to provide certain contraceptive services as a 
part of their employer-sponsored health care 
plan. Among these services are drugs and 
devices that the plaintiffs believe to be 
abortifacients, the use of which is contrary 
to their faith. 
We hold that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are 
entitled to bring claims under RFRA, have 
established a likelihood of success that their 
rights under this statute are substantially 
burdened by the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement, and have established an 
irreparable harm. But we remand the case to 
the district court for further proceedings on 
two of the remaining factors governing the 
grant or denial of a preliminary injunction… 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below 
and exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1), we reverse the district court's 
denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a 
preliminary injunction and remand with 
instructions that the district court address the 
remaining two preliminary injunction factors 
and then assess whether to grant or deny the 
plaintiffs' motion. 
I. Background & Procedural History 
A. The Plaintiffs 
The plaintiffs in this case are David and 
Barbara Green, their three children, and the 
businesses they collectively own and 
operate: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and 
Mardel, Inc. David Green is the founder of 
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Hobby Lobby, an arts and crafts chain with 
over 500 stores and about 13,000 full-time 
employees. Hobby Lobby is a closely held 
family business organized as an S-corp… 
Mart Green is the founder and CEO of 
Mardel, an affiliated chain of thirty-five 
Christian bookstores with just under 400 
employees, also run on a for-profit basis. 
As owners and operators of both Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel, the Greens have 
organized their businesses with express 
religious principles in mind…  
Furthermore, the Greens allow their faith to 
guide business decisions for both 
companies….  
The Greens operate Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel through a management trust (of 
which each Green is a trustee), and that trust 
is likewise governed by religious principles. 
The trust exists “to honor God with all that 
has been entrusted” to the Greens and to 
“use the Green family assets to create, 
support, and leverage the efforts of Christian 
ministries.” The trustees must sign “a Trust 
Commitment,” which among other things 
requires them to affirm the Green family 
statement of faith and to “regularly seek to 
maintain a close intimate walk with the Lord 
Jesus Christ by regularly investing time in 
His Word and prayer.”  
As is particularly relevant to this case, one 
aspect of the Greens' religious commitment 
is a belief that human life begins when 
sperm fertilizes an egg…  
B. The Contraceptive–Coverage 
Requirement 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA), employment-based group 
health plans covered by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
must provide certain types of preventive 
health services. One provision mandates 
coverage, without cost-sharing by plan 
participants or beneficiaries, of “preventive 
care and screenings” for women “as 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines 
supported by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration [HRSA] .” HRSA 
is an agency within the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). 
When the ACA was enacted, there were no 
HRSA guidelines related to preventive care 
and screening for women. As a result, HHS 
asked the Institute of Medicine [] to develop 
recommendations to help implement these 
requirements. In response, the Institute 
issued a report recommending [] that the 
guidelines require coverage for “ ‘[a]ll Food 
and Drug Administration [FDA] approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and 
counseling for all women with reproductive 
capacity,’ as prescribed by a provider.” 
HRSA and HHS adopted this 
recommendation, meaning that employment-
based group health plans covered by ERISA 
now must include FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods… Four of the twenty 
approved methods—two types of 
intrauterine devices (IUDs) and the 
emergency contraceptives commonly known 
as Plan B and Ella—can function by 
preventing the implantation of a fertilized 
egg. The remaining methods function by 
preventing fertilization. 
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C. Exemptions from the Contraceptive–
Coverage Requirement 
A number of entities are partially or fully 
exempted from the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement. 
First, HHS “may establish exemptions” for 
“group health plans established or 
maintained by religious employers and 
health insurance coverage provided in 
connection with group health plans 
established or maintained by religious 
employers with respect to any requirement 
to cover contraceptive services....”  
HHS regulations currently define a 
“religious employer” as an organization that: 
(1) has the inculcation of religious values as 
its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons 
who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily 
serves persons who share its religious tenets; 
and (4) is a non-profit organization 
described in a provision of the Internal 
Revenue Code that refers to churches, their 
integrated auxiliaries, conventions or 
associations of churches, and to the 
exclusively religious activities of any 
religious order.  
This definition of religious employer might 
change, however, as the federal agencies 
responsible for implementing the preventive 
services portion of the ACA have proposed 
a new rule that would eliminate the first 
three requirements above and clarify that the 
exemption is available to all non-profit 
organizations falling within the scope of a 
certain Internal Revenue Code provision.  
Second, the government has proposed an 
accommodation for certain other non-profit 
organizations, including religious 
institutions of higher education, that have 
maintained religious objections to 
contraceptive coverage yet will not fall 
within the amended definition of a religious 
employer…  
Third, if a business does not make certain 
significant changes to its health plans after 
the ACA's effective date, those plans are 
considered “grandfathered” and are exempt 
from the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement. Grandfathered plans may 
remain so indefinitely. 
Fourth, businesses with fewer than fifty 
employees are not required to participate in 
employer-sponsored health plans…  
Relying on information released by the 
White House and HHS, the plaintiffs 
estimate that at least 50 million people, and 
perhaps over a 100 million, are covered by 
exempt health plans. The government argues 
that the number of grandfathered health 
plans will decline over time, that 
grandfathered plans may already cover the 
objected-to contraceptives, and that financial 
incentives exist to push small businesses 
into the health insurance market, in which 
case they would have to comply with the 
contraceptive-coverage requirement… 
No exemption, proposed or otherwise, 
would extend to for-profit organizations like 
Hobby Lobby or Mardel. And the various 
government agencies responsible for 
implementing the exceptions to the 
contraceptive-coverage requirement have 
announced that no proposed exemption will 
extend to for-profit entities under any 
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circumstances because of what the 
government considers an important 
distinction, discussed further below, 
between for-profit and non-profit status. 
D. The Expected Effect of the 
Contraceptive–Coverage Requirement 
The Greens run the Hobby Lobby health 
plan, a self-insured plan, which provides 
insurance to both Hobby Lobby and Mardel 
employees. Hobby Lobby and Mardel 
cannot qualify for the “grandfathered” status 
exemption because they elected not to 
maintain grandfathered status prior to the 
date that the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement was proposed. 
Nevertheless, the Greens object to providing 
coverage for any FDA-approved 
contraceptives that would prevent 
implantation of a fertilized egg. Because the 
Greens believe that human life begins at 
conception, they also believe that they 
would be facilitating harms against human 
beings if the Hobby Lobby health plan 
provided coverage for the four FDA-
approved contraceptive methods that prevent 
uterine implantation (Ella, Plan B, and the 
two IUDs). The government does not 
dispute the sincerity of this belief. 
The Greens present no objection to 
providing coverage for the sixteen 
remaining contraceptive methods… 
According to the plaintiffs, the corporations' 
deadline to comply with the contraceptive-
coverage requirement is July 1, 2013. If the 
Hobby Lobby health plan does not cover all 
twenty contraceptive methods by that date, 
the businesses will be exposed to immediate 
tax penalties, potential regulatory action, 
and possible private lawsuits. 
The most immediate consequence for Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel would come in the form 
of regulatory taxes: $100 per day for each 
“individual to whom such failure relates.” 
The plaintiffs assert that because more than 
13,000 individuals are insured under the 
Hobby Lobby plan (which includes Mardel), 
this fine would total at least $1.3 million per 
day, or almost $475 million per year… If the 
corporations instead drop employee health 
insurance altogether, they will face penalties 
of $26 million per year.  
E. Procedural History 
The plaintiffs filed suit on September 12, 
2012, challenging the contraceptive-
coverage requirement under RFRA, the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 
and the Administrative Procedure Act. The 
plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a 
preliminary injunction on the basis of their 
RFRA and Free Exercise claims. The district 
court denied that motion.  
The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of the 
preliminary injunction and moved for 
injunctive relief pending appeal. A two-
judge panel denied relief pending appeal, 
adopting substantially the same reasoning as 
the district court. The plaintiffs then sought 
emergency relief under the All Writs Act 
from the Supreme Court, which also denied 
relief.  
The plaintiffs subsequently moved for initial 
en banc consideration of this appeal, citing 
the exceptional importance of the questions 
presented. We granted that motion. And 
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given Hobby Lobby and Mardel's July 1 
deadline for complying with the 
contraceptive-coverage requirement, we 
granted the plaintiffs' motion to expedite 
consideration of this appeal. 
II. The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel's central claims 
here arise under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. A plaintiff makes a prima 
facie case under RFRA by showing that the 
government substantially burdens a sincere 
religious exercise. The burden then shifts to 
the government to show that the 
“compelling interest test is satisfied through 
application of the challenged law ‘to the 
person’—the particular claimant whose 
sincere exercise of religion is being 
substantially burdened.”…  
The principal questions we must resolve 
here include: (1) whether Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel are “persons” exercising religion for 
purposes of RFRA; (2) if so, whether the 
corporations' religious exercise is 
substantially burdened; and (3) if there is a 
substantial burden, whether the government 
can demonstrate a narrowly tailored 
compelling government interest. 
III. Subject–Matter Jurisdiction 
Before turning to the preliminary injunction 
standard, we must resolve two issues that 
bear on our subject-matter jurisdiction—
standing and the Anti–Injunction Act. 
A. Standing 
We begin by examining whether Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel have standing to sue in 
federal court. Article III of the Constitution 
limits federal judicial power to “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”…  
We conclude that Hobby Lobby and Mardel 
have Article III standing. Both companies 
face an imminent loss of money, traceable to 
the contraceptive-coverage requirement. 
Both would receive redress if a court holds 
the contraceptive-coverage requirement 
unenforceable as to them… 
B. The Anti–Injunction Act 
A second possible impediment to our 
subject-matter jurisdiction is the Anti–
Injunction Act (AIA). Although the 
plaintiffs and the government agree that the 
AIA does not apply here, “subject-matter 
jurisdiction, because it involves a court's 
power to hear a case, can never be forfeited 
or waived.”…  
The AIA dictates, with statutory exceptions 
inapplicable to this case, that “no suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of any tax shall be maintained in 
any court by any person, whether or not 
such person is the person against whom such 
tax was assessed.”…  
In this case, the corporations' challenge 
relates to the government's authority under 
26 U.S.C. § 4980D, which imposes a “tax” 
on any employer that does not meet the 
ACA's health insurance requirements, 
including the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement… If an employer fails to 
provide health insurance, the employer is 
subject to a tax under § 4980H. And, as the 
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Supreme Court recently instructed, when 
Congress uses the term “tax,” it is a strong 
indication that Congress intends the AIA to 
apply.  
Still, the AIA does not apply to every 
lawsuit “tangentially related to taxes,” and 
the corporations' suit is not challenging the 
IRS's ability to collect taxes… [Rather,] 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not seeking to 
enjoin the collection of taxes or the 
execution of any IRS regulation; they are 
seeking to enjoin the enforcement, by 
whatever method, of one HHS regulation 
that they claim violates their RFRA rights. 
Indeed, a regulatory tax is just one of many 
collateral consequences that can result from 
a failure to comply with the contraceptive-
coverage requirement.  
And just as the AIA does not apply to any 
suit against the individual mandate, which is 
enforced by the IRS, so too does the AIA 
not apply to any suit against the 
contraceptive-coverage requirement, even 
though it also may be enforced by the IRS…  
Both sides agree that the AIA should not 
apply for essentially these same reasons. We 
are convinced by this reasoning and proceed 
to resolve the merits of the RFRA claim. 
IV. Preliminary Injunction Standard 
…We review the denial of a preliminary 
injunction for abuse of discretion…  
Under the traditional four-prong test for a 
preliminary injunction, the party moving for 
an injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) a likely threat of 
irreparable harm to the movant; (3) the harm 
alleged by the movant outweighs any harm 
to the non-moving party; and (4) an 
injunction is in the public interest.  
Hobby Lobby and Mardel urge that we 
apply a relaxed standard under which it can 
meet its burden for a preliminary injunction 
by showing the second, third, and fourth 
factors “tip strongly in [its] favor.”… But 
we need not resolve whether this relaxed 
standard would apply here, given that a 
majority of the court holds that Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel have satisfied the 
likelihood-of-success prong under the 
traditional standard. 
The district court ruled that the corporations 
failed the likelihood-of-success element 
because even closely held family businesses 
like Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not 
protected by RFRA. 
We disagree with this conclusion and 
determine that the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement substantially burdens Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel's rights under RFRA. 
And at this stage, the government has not 
shown a narrowly tailored compelling 
interest to justify this burden. 
V. Merits 
A. Hobby Lobby and Mardel Are 
“Persons Exercising Religion” Under 
RFRA 
RFRA provides, as a general rule, that the 
“Government shall not substantially burden 
a person's exercise of religion.” The parties 
dispute whether for-profit corporations, such 
as Hobby Lobby and Mardel, are persons 
exercising religion for purposes of RFRA. 
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We thus turn to the question of whether 
Hobby Lobby, as a family owned business 
furthering its religious mission, and Mardel, 
as a Christian bookstore, can take advantage 
of RFRA's protections. 
The government makes two arguments for 
why this is not the case. First, it cites to civil 
rights statutes and labor laws that create an 
exemption for religious organizations…The 
government [] argues that, as a matter of 
statutory interpretation, RFRA should be 
read to carry forward the supposedly 
preexisting distinction between non-profit, 
religious corporations and for-profit, secular 
corporations. Second, the government 
asserts that the for-profit/non-profit 
distinction is rooted in the Free Exercise 
Clause. It suggests Congress did not intend 
RFRA to expand the scope of the Free 
Exercise Clause. The government therefore 
concludes RFRA does not extend to for-
profit corporations. 
We reject both of these arguments. First, we 
hold as a matter of statutory interpretation 
that Congress did not exclude for-profit 
corporations from RFRA's protections. Such 
corporations can be “persons” exercising 
religion for purposes of the statute. Second, 
as a matter of constitutional law, Free 
Exercise rights may extend to some for-
profit organizations. 
1. Statutory Interpretation 
a. The Dictionary Act 
We begin with the statutory text. RFRA 
contains no special definition of “person.” 
Thus, our first resource in determining what 
Congress meant by “person” in RFRA is the 
Dictionary Act, which instructs: “In 
determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, unless the context indicates 
otherwise * * * the word[ ] ‘person’ ... 
include[s] corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, 
and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.” Thus, we could end the matter 
here since the plain language of the text 
encompasses “corporations,” including ones 
like Hobby Lobby and Mardel. 
In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed 
the RFRA rights of corporate claimants, 
notwithstanding the claimants' decision to 
use the corporate form.  
b. Other Statutes 
Given that no one disputes at least some 
types of corporate entities can bring RFRA 
claims, the next question is whether 
Congress intended to exclude for-profit 
corporations, as opposed to non-profit 
corporations, from RFRA's scope. Notably, 
neither the Dictionary Act nor RFRA 
explicitly distinguishes between for-profit 
and non-profit corporations; the Dictionary 
Act merely instructs that the term “persons” 
includes corporations. 
At the same time, we acknowledge the 
Dictionary Act definition does not apply if 
“the context indicates otherwise.” Generally, 
“context” here “means the text of the Act of 
Congress surrounding the word at issue, or 
the text of other related congressional Acts.” 
The government contends that RFRA's 
“context” points to exemptions for religious 
employers in other statutes, and in particular 
it directs us to the religious exemptions 
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contained in Title VII, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). But rather 
than providing contextual support for 
excluding for-profit corporations from 
RFRA, we think these exemptions show that 
Congress knows how to craft a corporate 
religious exemption, but chose not to do so 
in RFRA… 
In short, the government believes Congress 
used “person” in RFRA as extreme 
shorthand for something like “natural person 
or ‘religious organization’ as that term was 
used in exemptions for religious 
organizations as set forth in Title VII, the 
ADA, and the NLRA.” 
This reading strikes us as strained. Indeed, 
the exemptions present in Title VII, the 
ADA, and the NLRA suggest the opposite 
inference from what the government draws. 
Rather than implying that similar narrowing 
constructions should be imported into 
statutes that do not contain such language, 
they imply Congress is quite capable of 
narrowing the scope of a statutory 
entitlement or affording a type of statutory 
exemption when it wants to. The corollary to 
this rule, of course, is that when the 
exemptions are not present, it is not that they 
are “carried forward” but rather that they do 
not apply…  
c. Case Law 
The government nonetheless points to 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
v. Amos, for the idea that the for-profit/non-
profit distinction was well-established in 
Congress's mind before it enacted RFRA. 
We disagree with the government's 
interpretation of Amos. 
Amos involved employees of non-profit and 
arguably non-religious businesses run by the 
Mormon Church. These businesses had fired 
certain Mormon employees who did not 
follow church behavioral standards, and the 
employees sued under Title VII. The Church 
moved to dismiss based on Title VII's 
exemption for “religious corporation[s].”… 
The plaintiffs countered “that if construed to 
allow religious employers to discriminate on 
religious grounds in hiring for nonreligious 
jobs, [the exemption] violates the 
Establishment Clause.” The district court 
agreed, reasoning in part that Title VII's 
exemption unlawfully advanced religion 
because it could “permit churches with 
financial resources impermissibly to extend 
their influence and propagate their faith by 
entering the commercial, profit-making 
world.”  
The Supreme Court reversed. It concluded 
this particular part of the district court's 
reasoning was incorrect because it assumed 
the existence of for-profit activities yet none 
of the Mormon businesses at issue operated 
on a for-profit basis. The Court never 
reached the question of how for-profit 
activity might have changed its analysis…  
From these references to non-profit status in 
Amos, the government concludes that the 
for-profit/non-profit distinction matters a 
great deal. But we do not see what the 
government sees in Amos… At best [] Amos 
leaves open the question of whether for-
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profit status matters for Title VII's religious 
employer exemption…  
Nor do the other post-RFRA circuit cases on 
which the government relies provide more 
guidance… 
In conclusion, the government has given us 
no persuasive reason to think that Congress 
meant “person” in RFRA to mean anything 
other than its default meaning in the 
Dictionary Act—which includes 
corporations regardless of their profit-
making status. 
2. Free Exercise 
The government further argues that the 
“[t]he distinction between non-profit, 
religious organizations and for-profit, 
secular companies is rooted in the text of the 
First Amendment.” It claims this 
understanding of the First Amendment 
informed what Congress intended by 
“person” in RFRA. Undoubtedly, Congress's 
understanding of the First Amendment 
informed its drafting of RFRA, but we see 
no basis for concluding that such an 
understanding included a for-
profit/nonprofit distinction. 
a. RFRA's Purpose 
RFRA was Congress's attempt to 
legislatively overrule Employment Division 
v. Smith. Smith had abrogated much of the 
Supreme Court's earlier jurisprudence 
regarding whether a neutral law of general 
application nonetheless impermissibly 
burdened a person's Free Exercise rights. 
The pre-Smith test exempted such a person 
from the law's constraints unless the 
government could show a compelling need 
to apply the law to the person. Smith 
eliminated that test on the theory that the 
Constitution permits burdening Free 
Exercise if that burden results from a neutral 
law of general application.  
Congress responded to Smith by enacting 
RFRA, which re-imposed a stricter standard 
on both the states and the federal 
government…  
Congress, through RFRA, intended to bring 
Free Exercise jurisprudence back to the test 
established before Smith. There is no 
indication Congress meant to alter any other 
aspect of pre-Smith jurisprudence—
including jurisprudence regarding who can 
bring Free Exercise claims. We therefore 
turn to that jurisprudence. 
b. Corporate and For–Profit Free 
Exercise Rights 
It is beyond question that associations—not 
just individuals—have Free Exercise 
rights…  
Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause is not 
a “ ‘purely personal’ guarantee[ ] ... 
unavailable to corporations and other 
organizations because the ‘historic function’ 
of the particular [constitutional] guarantee 
has been limited to the protection of 
individuals.” As should be obvious, the Free 
Exercise Clause at least extends to 
associations like churches—including those 
that incorporate…  
In short, individuals may incorporate for 
religious purposes and keep their Free 
Exercise rights, and unincorporated 
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individuals may pursue profit while keeping 
their Free Exercise rights… 
This position is not “rooted in the text of the 
First Amendment,” and therefore could not 
have informed Congress's intent when 
enacting RFRA. As an initial matter, the 
debates in Congress surrounding the 
adoption of the First Amendment 
demonstrate an intent to protect a range of 
conduct broader than the mere right to 
believe whatever one chooses… 
We [] believe that a constitutional 
distinction would conflict with the Supreme 
Court's Free Exercise precedent. First, we 
cannot see why an individual operating for-
profit retains Free Exercise protections but 
an individual who incorporates—even as the 
sole shareholder—does not, even though he 
engages in the exact same activities as 
before… Religious associations can 
incorporate, gain those protections, and 
nonetheless retain their Free Exercise rights. 
Moreover, when the Supreme Court 
squarely addressed for-profit individuals' 
Free Exercise rights in Lee and Braunfeld, 
its analysis did not turn on the individuals' 
unincorporated status. Nor did the Court 
suggest that the Free Exercise right would 
have disappeared, using a more modern 
formulation, in a general or limited 
partnership, sole professional corporation, 
LLC, S-corp, or closely held family business 
like we have here. 
In addition, sincerely religious persons could 
find a connection between the exercise of 
religion and the pursuit of profit… 
We are also troubled—as we believe 
Congress would be—by the notion that Free 
Exercise rights turn on Congress's definition 
of “non-profit.”… 
[T]he government cites to the Supreme 
Court's recent Hosanna–Tabor decision, 
where the Court recognized a ministerial 
exception that foreclosed review of the 
propriety of the decision of a “church” 
(understood in a broad sense that includes 
all religions) to hire or retain a “minister” 
(with the same broad meaning). In 
recognizing this ministerial exception, the 
Court found the exception precluded a claim 
brought under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act by a former employee of a 
school run by a denomination of the 
Lutheran church. The Court reiterated the 
uncontroversial proposition that “the text of 
the First Amendment ... gives special 
solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.” From this language, the 
government draws a narrow application of 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
We do not share this interpretation. The 
main point of the Court was that the 
Religion Clauses add to the mix when 
considering freedom of association. But it 
does not follow that because religious 
organizations obtain protections through the 
Religion Clauses, all entities not included in 
the definition of religious organization are 
accorded no rights… 
The government [also] raises the specter of 
future cases in which, for example, a large 
publicly traded corporation tries to assert 
religious rights under RFRA. That would 
certainly seem to raise difficult questions of 
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how to determine the corporation's sincerity 
of belief. But that is not an issue here…  
[We find that] Hobby Lobby and Mardel [] 
qualify as “persons” under RFRA. 
B. Substantial Burden 
The next question is whether the 
contraceptive-coverage requirement 
constitutes a substantial burden on Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel's exercise of religion. 
The government urges that there can be no 
substantial burden here because “[a]n 
employee's decision to use her health 
coverage to pay for a particular item or 
service cannot properly be attributed to her 
employer.”… 
This position is fundamentally flawed 
because it advances an understanding of 
“substantial burden” that presumes 
“substantial” requires an inquiry into the 
theological merit of the belief in question 
rather than the intensity of the coercion 
applied by the government to act contrary to 
those beliefs…  
No one disputes in this case the sincerity of 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel's religious beliefs. 
And because the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement places substantial pressure on 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel to violate their 
sincere religious beliefs, their exercise of 
religion is substantially burdened within the 
meaning of RFRA. 
1. The Substantial Burden Test 
Our most developed case discussing the 
substantial burden test is Abdulhaseeb v. 
Calbone. In Abdulhaseeb, we were required 
to resolve a RFRA claim brought by [] a 
Muslim prisoner who raised a religious 
objection to the prison's failure to provide 
him a halal diet. Abdulhaseeb alleged that 
the prison cafeteria's failure to serve halal 
food violated his rights under the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(RLUIPA), a statute that adopts RFRA's 
“substantial burden” standard. 
In analyzing Abdulhaseeb's claim, we held 
that a government act imposes a “substantial 
burden” on religious exercise if it: (1) 
“requires participation in an activity 
prohibited by a sincerely held religious 
belief,” (2) “prevents participation in 
conduct motivated by a sincerely held 
religious belief,” or (3) “places substantial 
pressure on an adherent ... to engage in 
conduct contrary to a sincerely held 
religious belief.” Our analysis in 
Abdulhaseeb only concerned the third prong 
of this test, related to “substantial pressure.” 
[T]he same is true here. 
The substantial pressure prong rests firmly 
on Supreme Court precedent, in particular: 
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana 
Employment Security Division. 
The plaintiff in Thomas was a Jehovah's 
Witness who had worked for a company that 
owned both a foundry and factory… 
Although he had no objection to working in 
the foundry, he raised a religious objection 
to his factory job, claiming that “he could 
not work on weapons without violating the 
principles of his religion.” He quit his job 
and was [] denied unemployment benefits. 
He then challenged this decision as 
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improperly burdening his right to exercise 
his religion… 
In considering the Free Exercise claim, the 
Court noted that the plaintiff could not 
clearly articulate the basis for the difference 
between processing steel that might be used 
in tanks and manufacturing the turrets 
themselves. [The Court held that] 
“[p]articularly in this sensitive area, it is not 
within the judicial function and judicial 
competence to inquire whether the petitioner 
... correctly perceived the commands of [his] 
faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”…  
Accepting the plaintiff's religious beliefs as 
sincere, the Court then examined “the 
coercive impact” upon him… On that score, 
the Court found a substantial burden: 
Where the state conditions receipt of an 
important benefit upon conduct proscribed 
by a religious faith, or where it denies such 
a benefit because of conduct mandated by 
religious belief, thereby putting substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his 
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a 
burden upon religion exists. While the 
compulsion may be indirect, the 
infringement upon free exercise is 
nonetheless substantial. 
United States v. Lee similarly demonstrates 
that the burden analysis does not turn on 
whether the government mandate operates 
directly or indirectly, but on the coercion the 
claimant feels to violate his beliefs…  
Given the foregoing, our first step in 
Abdulhaseeb was to identify the belief in 
question [] and to determine if the belief was 
sincerely held. Finding it was, we stated that 
“the issue is not whether the lack of a halal 
diet that includes meats substantially 
burdens the religious exercise of any 
Muslim practitioner, but whether it 
substantially burdens Mr. Abdulhaseeb's 
own exercise of his sincerely held religious 
beliefs.” We concluded that the prison 
cafeteria's “failure to provide a halal diet 
either prevents Mr. Abdulhaseeb's religious 
exercise, or, at the least, places substantial 
pressure on Mr. Abdulhaseeb not to engage 
in his religious exercise by presenting him 
with a Hobson's choice—either he eats a 
non-halal diet in violation of his sincerely 
held beliefs, or he does not eat.” Thus, the 
plaintiff faced a substantial burden. 
2. Applying the Substantial Burden Test 
…First, we must identify the religious belief 
in this case. The corporate plaintiffs believe 
life begins at conception. Thus, they have 
what they describe as “a sincere religious 
objection to providing coverage for Plan B 
and Ella...” And they allege a “sincere 
religious objection to providing coverage for 
certain contraceptive [IUDs]...”  
Second, we must determine whether this 
belief is sincere. The government does not 
dispute the corporations' sincerity, and we 
see no reason to question it either. 
Third, we turn to the question of whether the 
government places substantial pressure on 
the religious believer. Here, it is difficult to 
characterize the pressure as anything but 
substantial…  
[W]e believe that Hobby Lobby and Mardel 
have made a threshold showing regarding a 
substantial burden. Ordinarily, the question 
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of substantial burden would involve 
subsidiary factual issues. But in the district 
court, the government did not question the 
significance of the financial burden… Thus, 
the district court record leaves only one 
possible scenario: Hobby Lobby and Mardel 
incurred a substantial burden on their ability 
to exercise their religion because the law 
requires Hobby Lobby and Mardel to: 
• compromise their religious beliefs, 
• pay close to $475 million more in taxes 
every year, or 
• pay roughly $26 million more in annual 
taxes and drop health-insurance benefits for 
all employees. 
This is precisely the sort of Hobson's choice 
described in Abdulhaseeb, and Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel have established a 
substantial burden as a matter of law. 
… 
C. Compelling Interest and Least 
Restrictive Means 
As noted above, even at the preliminary 
injunction stage, RFRA requires the 
government to demonstrate that mandating a 
plaintiff's compliance with the 
contraceptive-coverage requirement is “the 
least restrictive means of advancing a 
compelling interest.”…  
The interest must also be narrowly tailored. 
“RFRA requires the Government to 
demonstrate that the compelling interest test 
is satisfied through application of the 
challenged law ‘to the person’...”  
1. Compelling Interest 
The government asserts two interests here: 
“the interests in [1] public health and [2] 
gender equality.” We recognize the 
importance of these interests. But they 
nonetheless in this context do not satisfy the 
Supreme Court's compelling interest 
standards. 
First, both interests as articulated by the 
government are insufficient under O Centro 
because they are “broadly formulated 
interests justifying the general applicability 
of government mandates.”…  
Second, the interest here cannot be 
compelling because the contraceptive-
coverage requirement presently does not 
apply to tens of millions of people…  
2. Least Restrictive Means 
Even if the government had stated a 
compelling interest in public health or 
gender equality, it has not explained how 
those larger interests would be undermined 
by granting Hobby Lobby and Mardel their 
requested exemption…  
3. Hobby Lobby and Mardel Employees 
Finally, we note a concern raised both at 
oral argument and in the government's 
briefing that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are, 
in effect, imposing their religious views on 
their employees or otherwise burdening their 
employees' religious beliefs. But Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel do not prevent employees 
from using their own money to purchase the 
four contraceptives at issue here… 
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In sum, for all of these reasons, Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel have established they are 
likely to succeed on their RFRA claim. 
VI. Remaining Preliminary Injunction 
Factors 
Having concluded that Hobby Lobby and 
Mardel are likely to succeed on the merits, 
we turn to the remaining preliminary 
injunction factors: whether Hobby Lobby 
and Mardel face irreparable harm; whether 
the balance of equities tips in Hobby Lobby 
and Mardel's favor; and whether an 
injunction is in the public interest. The 
district court did not analyze these factors [] 
but Hobby Lobby and Mardel nonetheless 
ask that we reach them. 
A. Propriety of Reaching the Remaining 
Factors 
“If the district court fails to analyze the 
factors necessary to justify a preliminary 
injunction, this court may do so [in the first 
instance] if the record is sufficiently 
developed.” The record we have is the 
record the parties chose to create below—it 
is the record they deemed sufficient for the 
district court to decide the preliminary 
injunction question. For each element, we 
believe this record suffices for us to resolve 
each of the remaining preliminary injunction 
factors… 
[T]he government nowhere contested the 
factual adequacy or accuracy of Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel's allegations, and given 
that those allegations were established 
through a verified complaint, they are 
deemed admitted for preliminary injunction 
purposes.  
In short, the record before us is enough to 
resolve the remaining preliminary injunction 
factors. Given Hobby Lobby and Mardel's 
July 1 deadline, prudence strongly counsels 
in favor of reaching those factors. Thus, we 
would reach them and find that they favor 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel…  
B. Analysis of Remaining Factors 
1. Irreparable Harm 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel have established a 
likely violation of RFRA. We have 
explicitly held [] that establishing a likely 
RFRA violation satisfies the irreparable 
harm factor… 
2. Balance of Equities 
Nor is there any question about the balance 
of equities. A preliminary injunction would 
forestall the government's ability to extend 
all twenty approved contraceptive methods 
to Hobby Lobby and Mardel's 13,000 
employees…  
3. Public Interest 
Finally, as stated above, “it is always in the 
public interest to prevent the violation of a 
party's constitutional rights.”… 
[A]ccommodating the two companies in this 
case does not undermine the application of 
the contraceptive-coverage requirement to 
the vast number of employers without 
religious objections… 
In sum, all preliminary injunction factors tip 
in favor of Hobby Lobby and Mardel, and 
we would therefore remand to the district 
court with instructions to enter a preliminary 
injunction. 
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VII. Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse 
the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction and 
remand with instructions that the district 
court address the remaining two preliminary 
injunction factors and then assess whether to 
grant or deny the plaintiffs' motion. The 
Clerk is directed to issue the mandate 
forthwith. 
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
I join Judge Tymkovich's opinion but write 
separately to [express that] I think (1) that 
all corporations come within the protection 
of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA and 
(2) that the substantial-burden analysis here 
is a simple one. 
… 
GORSUCH, joined by KELLY and 
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges, 
concurring. 
…I write to explain why the Greens 
themselves, as individuals, are also entitled 
to relief and why the Anti–Injunction Act 
does not preclude us from supplying that 
relief… 
No doubt, the Greens' religious convictions 
are contestable. Some may even find the 
Greens' beliefs offensive. But no one 
disputes that they are sincerely held 
religious beliefs…  
I write to emphasize that, even if the parties 
are wrong and the AIA does apply to this 
case, it still wouldn't allow us to avoid 
reaching the merits. It wouldn't because the 
government has expressly waived any 
reliance on the AIA: not only did it fail to 
raise the AIA as a defense in the district 
court, it discouraged us from applying the 
statute when we invited additional briefing 
on the matter. So long as the AIA affords the 
government only a waivable defense—so 
long as it doesn't impose on the courts a 
jurisdictional limit on our statutory authority 
to entertain this case—we are bound to 
reach the merits. And a waivable defense, 
we are persuaded, is all the AIA provides… 
In the end, the AIA shows none of the 
hallmarks of a jurisdictional restriction, and 
has many features that collectively indicate 
otherwise. The government can waive its 
application, and it has done so before us. 
Given that, we can be sure, perhaps doubly 
sure, that reaching the merits of this case is 
appropriate and indeed our duty. 
BACHARACH, J., concurring. 
…I believe that Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
and Mardel, Inc. are “persons” under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. I write 
separately to: 
• discuss the need for a remand so that the 
district court can address the balancing 
elements of the preliminary-injunction 
inquiry and 
• address prudential standing and conclude 
that we should instruct the district court to 
dismiss the Greens' claims. 
I. The Need for Remand to the District 
Court on the Balancing Elements 
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I respectfully decline to join Parts VI(A), 
(B)(2), and (B)(3) of the plurality opinion 
because I believe that the required balancing 
of interests should be conducted by the 
district court rather than the court of 
appeals…  
The district court did err, as the plurality 
concludes, by holding that Hobby Lobby 
and Mardel are unlikely to succeed on the 
merits. Still, Hobby Lobby and Mardel can 
obtain a preliminary injunction only if they 
persuade a court of three additional 
elements: (1) irreparable injury; (2) 
avoidance of injury to the public interest; 
and (3) greater injury to themselves, if a 
preliminary injunction were to be denied, 
than to the defendants if a preliminary 
injunction were to be granted. These 
elements have not been addressed by the 
district court… 
In urging that we allow the district court to 
balance the remaining elements, I am 
mindful of the time pressures on the 
courts—and on Hobby Lobby and Mardel—
as the deadline of July 1, 2013, approaches. 
Still, I do not think these time pressures 
should induce us to step outside of our 
institutional limits and usurp a role better 
suited to the district court. 
II. The Greens' Standing to Sue in their 
Personal Capacities 
[T]he plurality opinion states that we need 
not address the Greens' standing. I believe, 
however, that we should do so. In 
addressing the Greens' standing, we should 
consider whether Congress abrogated 
prudential restrictions in RFRA and, if not, 
whether the Greens' alleged injuries derive 
solely from the injuries sustained by Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel. 
In my view, Congress did not abrogate 
prudential-standing restrictions in RFRA, 
and the Greens' claims derive solely from 
the alleged injuries sustained by Hobby 
Lobby and Mardel. As a result, I would 
direct the district court to dismiss the 
Greens' claims based on the shareholder-
standing rule. 
… 
BRISCOE, Chief Judge, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, joined by 
LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 
…I [] dissent from the majority's conclusion 
that Hobby Lobby and Mardel have 
established a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits of their RFRA claims, 
and the majority's concomitant decision to 
reverse the district court's denial of 
plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive 
relief. 
I. The Anti–Injunction Act 
…I [] concur in the conclusion that the AIA 
does not bar the RFRA claims at issue in 
this appeal. 
II. The Record on Appeal 
…I fail to see how plaintiffs could 
reasonably be said to have carried their 
burden of establishing their entitlement to a 
preliminary injunction. And, relatedly, I am 
concerned, given these evidentiary 
deficiencies, about the majority's eagerness 
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to issue seemingly definitive rulings on the 
merits of plaintiffs' novel claim that for-
profit corporations are entitled to coverage 
under RFRA.  
III. Are Hobby Lobby and Mardel 
Persons Exercising Religion Under 
RFRA? 
In the first part of its merits analysis, the 
majority addresses the question of whether 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel qualify as 
“persons exercising religion for purposes of 
RFRA.” [T[he majority makes a number of 
critical mistakes in doing so. And its 
ultimate holding, which is unprecedented, is 
sufficiently ambiguous that neither the 
majority nor anyone else can confidently 
predict where it may lead, particularly when 
one considers how easily an “exercise of 
religion” could now be asserted by a 
corporation to avoid or take advantage of 
any governmental rule or requirement. 
… 
I conclude on that basis that Hobby Lobby 
and Mardel have failed to carry their burden 
of establishing a likelihood of success on the 
merits of their RFRA claims. 
IV. Substantial Burden 
In the second part of its merits analysis, the 
majority addresses the question of “whether 
the contraceptive-coverage requirement 
constitutes a substantial burden on plaintiffs' 
exercise of religion.”…  
[P]laintiffs presented no evidence at all 
during the hearing on their motion for 
preliminary injunction. That failure is not 
entirely fatal to their claims, because there 
appears to be agreement among the parties 
and amici that certain intrauterine devices 
actually have, as a matter of scientific fact, 
the potential to prevent implantation of a 
fertilized egg. But there is no such 
consensus with respect to the contraceptive 
drugs challenged by the plaintiffs. 
Consequently, plaintiffs' tactical decision to 
present no evidence on this point appears, to 
me, to prevent them from establishing that 
the regulatory requirement to provide 
healthcare coverage encompassing these 
drugs substantially burdens their exercise of 
religion. 
V. Remaining Preliminary Injunction 
Factors 
I also believe that the plurality errs in its 
consideration of the three remaining 
preliminary injunction factors, i.e., whether 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel face irreparable 
harm, whether the balance of equities tips in 
favor of Hobby Lobby and Mardel, and 
whether an injunction is in the public 
interest. 
… 
MATHESON, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
… 
I. THE CORPORATIONS' RFRA 
CLAIM 
…I do not think the corporate plaintiffs have 
demonstrated they can so easily disregard 
the corporate form and assume the Greens' 
religious beliefs. Accordingly, I do not think 
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the district court abused its discretion in 
holding that Hobby Lobby and Mardel failed 
to show they are substantially likely to 
succeed on the merits of their RFRA claim. 
Nevertheless, I would stop at concluding 
that the plaintiffs have not met their 
preliminary injunction burden and would not 
foreclose the issue of RFRA coverage for 
secular, for-profit corporations from future 
consideration. Prudential considerations of 
judicial restraint take me to this position. 
A. Plaintiffs' Failure to Meet Preliminary 
Injunction Burden on Law and Facts 
Chief Judge Briscoe raises serious concerns 
about the majority's analysis and 
conclusions. These concerns are sufficient to 
conclude that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying a preliminary 
injunction to Hobby Lobby and Mardel… 
The allegations in the complaint suggest that 
Hobby Lobby and Mardel have features that 
could set them apart from other for-profit 
businesses and even from each other, but the 
plaintiffs provide no evidence in support. 
The record does not allow meaningful 
consideration of whether RFRA applies to 
either of the two plaintiff corporations. 
B. Disregarding the Corporate Form 
…Perhaps Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and the 
Greens can make a successful argument for 
disregarding the corporate form and sharing 
religious beliefs. But courts require evidence 
to disregard the corporate form, and the 
plaintiffs have presented none. Yet they 
filed their suit and immediately asked the 
district court to relieve the corporations of 
their legal obligations to their employees 
under the Regulation, even when we have 
repeatedly said that “a preliminary 
injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and 
thus the right to relief must be clear and 
unequivocal.”  
C. Judicial Restraint 
Although I conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
corporate plaintiffs' RFRA claim, I do not 
think we need to decide as a final matter 
whether for-profit, secular corporations have 
RFRA or Free Exercise Clause rights. The 
corporate plaintiffs' failure to meet their 
burden of showing they are substantially 
likely to succeed on the merits is a sufficient 
basis to affirm the district court's order… 
II. THE GREENS' RFRA CLAIM 
Unlike Hobby Lobby and Mardel, the 
Greens do not have to convince us that they 
have RFRA rights. It is clear they do. The 
obstacle they must overcome is whether they 
can claim that the Regulation violates their 
RFRA rights even though the Regulation 
applies to the corporate plaintiffs. 
I would hold that the Greens have standing 
to pursue their RFRA claim because they 
have shown the Regulation injures them in a 
direct, personal way. I would then remand to 
the district court with instructions to 
reconsider their request for a preliminary 
injunction in light of a proper understanding 
of the Greens' claim that the Regulation 
substantially burdens their religious beliefs. 
… 
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III. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE CLAIM 
The district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying a preliminary injunction for the 
plaintiffs' Free Exercise claim because they 
have not clearly and unequivocally shown 
that they are substantially likely to succeed 
on the merits…. 
CONCLUSION 
I would (1) affirm the district court's denial 
of a preliminary injunction for Hobby Lobby 
and Mardel on their RFRA claim; (2) 
conclude that the Greens have standing to 
assert their RFRA and Free Exercise claims; 
(3) reverse the district court's holding that 
the Greens' RFRA claim is not substantially 
likely to succeed and remand for 
reconsideration; and (4) affirm the district 
court's denial of a preliminary injunction on 
the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause claim. 
Finally, I concur that the Anti–Injunction 
Act does not apply to this case. 
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“Contraceptive Mandate Divides Appeals Courts” 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
July 26, 2013 
 
A federal appeals court ruling on Friday 
increased the chances that the Supreme 
Court in its coming term will need to settle 
whether secular, for-profit corporations must 
provide contraceptive coverage to 
employees despite the owners’ religious 
objections. 
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the 3rd Circuit ruled that a 
Pennsylvania cabinet-making company 
owned by a Mennonite family must comply 
with the contraceptive mandate contained in 
the Affordable Care Act. 
The majority said it “respectfully disagrees” 
with judges in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 10th Circuit in Denver, who recently 
narrowly found just the opposite. A split in 
interpreting federal statutes is usually an 
invitation for the Supreme Court to resolve 
the issue. 
This one is novel: The justices have never 
said whether a secular corporation is 
protected by the Constitution or federal 
statute from complying with a law because 
of religious objections from its owners. 
The 3rd Circuit majority noted that the court 
has numerous times — most recently in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission — found that corporations have 
free speech rights. But it said there was a 
“total absence of caselaw” to support the 
argument that corporations are protected by 
the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise 
of religion. 
“Even if we were to disregard the lack of 
historical recognition of the right, we simply 
cannot understand how a for-profit, secular 
corporation — apart from its owners — can 
exercise religion,” wrote Circuit Judge 
Robert E. Cowen, who was joined by Circuit 
Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie. 
Cowen said it did not seem plausible that an 
entity “created to make money could 
exercise such an inherently ‘human’ right.” 
Circuit Judge Kent A. Jordan said in a 
dissent twice as long as the majority opinion 
that if there is a lack of case law establishing 
a corporation’s religious rights, “that is in all 
probability because there has never before 
been a government policy that could be 
perceived as intruding on religious liberty as 
aggressively as the mandate.” 
The mandate requires companies with 50 or 
more employees to provide insurance that 
covers federally approved birth control 
measures. Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Company, which has 950 employees, is 
owned by the Hahn family, who say their 
Mennonite religion teaches that life begins 
at conception. They particularly object to 
having to cover the “morning-after” and 
“week-after” pills. 
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The lawsuit is among more than 60 filed 
across the country objecting to the 
contraceptive mandate. Some are filed by 
companies such as Conestoga and others by 
nonprofit groups and organizations with 
religious connections. 
In a decision by the entire 10th Circuit, the 
closely divided judges ruled that the chain 
store Hobby Lobby was likely protected by 
the Constitution and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act from having to provide 
contraceptive coverage that violated the 
owners’ religious beliefs. 
“It looks like we’re heading for a Supreme 
Court review,” said Kyle Duncan, general 
counsel of the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, which is active in opposing the 
contraceptive mandate. 
Marcia Greenberger of the National 
Women’s Law Center, which supports the 
law, agreed, and noted that other appeals 
courts will likely soon be deciding other 
cases on the issue. 
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“ObamaCare Birth Control Mandate on Fast Track to Supreme Court” 
The Hill 
Sam Baker 
August 22, 2013 
ObamaCare's birth control mandate is 
putting the president's signature legislative 
issue on a fast track back to the Supreme 
Court.  
Lawyers on both sides of the issue say the 
high court will almost certainly have to rule 
on the controversial policy, possibly as early 
as its next term. 
Two federal appeals courts have come down 
with opposite rulings on an important 
question related to the policy: whether for-
profit businesses and their owners have the 
right to challenge in court the requirement 
that businesses provide contraception as part 
of their insurance coverage. 
“I think it’s likely the Supreme Court is 
going to end up deciding this thing, and the 
question is when,” said Mark Rienzi, senior 
counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious 
Liberty, which has organized many of the 
60-plus lawsuits challenging the 
contraception mandate. 
The different rulings by the two federal 
appeals courts significantly increase the 
likelihood the mandate will end up with the 
Supreme Court, possibly with a ruling just 
two years after the justices ruled 
ObamaCare’s insurance mandate was 
constitutional. 
Louise Melling, deputy legal director at the 
American Civil Liberties Union, which 
supports the contraception mandate, said it’s 
“likely” the Supreme Court could hear oral 
arguments in its next term, depending on the 
timing of appeals. 
“I would anticipate, when there’s this much 
activity … that the court will hear one of 
these,” Melling said. 
Last month, a panel of judges on the 3rd 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the 
owners of a for-profit corporation who sued 
to block the mandate. 
Members of the Hahn family, which owns a 
cabinet-making firm called Conestoga, said 
complying with the contraception 
requirement would violate their Mennonite 
faith. 
But the 3rd Circuit said the family could not 
sue over a policy that applies to its 
company. 
“Since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns, 
the Mandate does not actually require the 
Hahns to do anything,” the court said. “All 
responsibility for complying with the 
Mandate falls on Conestoga.” 
The owners’ religious beliefs do not “pass 
through” to the corporation they own, the 
court said in its ruling. 
“The Hahn family chose to incorporate and 
conduct business through Conestoga, 
thereby obtaining both the advantages and 
disadvantages of the corporate form. We 
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simply cannot ignore the distinction between 
Conestoga and the Hahns,” the court said. 
The ACLU’s Melling said the 3rd Circuit 
got it right. The Constitution guarantees 
freedom of religion to individuals, she said, 
not businesses. 
“Corporations don’t pray and have values,” 
Melling said. 
Alliance Defending Freedom, the group 
representing Conestoga and the Hahns, has 
vowed to appeal the ruling to the Supreme 
Court. Matt Bowman, the alliance’s legal 
director, said the group will file its appeal as 
soon as possible. 
“We are hopeful that the court will take this 
because whether families can exercise 
religion in their daily lives is an extremely 
important issue, and it can’t be an issue that 
has a different answer based on what part of 
the country you live in,” Bowman said in an 
interview. 
ObamaCare’s birth control mandate requires 
most employers to include contraception in 
their employees’ healthcare plans without 
charging a co-pay or deductible. 
Churches and houses of worship are 
completely exempt. Religious-affiliated 
employers, like Catholic schools and 
hospitals, don’t have to offer or pay for the 
coverage themselves, but their insurance 
companies still have to make it available 
without cost-sharing. 
Most lawsuits against the mandate have 
been filed by religious-affiliated institutions, 
but some for-profit corporations without a 
religious mission have also sued, citing the 
religious beliefs of their owners. 
Critics of the mandate won an important 
victory in June, when the 10th Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled in June that the owners of 
Hobby Lobby, a chain of arts-and-crafts 
stores, could sue to block the mandate from 
applying to their company. 
“Would an incorporated kosher butcher 
really have no claim to challenge a 
regulation mandating non-kosher butchering 
practices?” the 10th Circuit asked. “The 
kosher butcher, of course, might directly 
serve a religious community … But we see 
no reason why one must orient one’s 
business toward a religious community to 
preserve Free Exercise protections.” 
It’s possible the court could simply agree to 
hear the Conestoga case, but legal experts 
said they’re primarily keeping an eye on the 
Hobby Lobby suit. 
How quickly the mandate makes it to the 
Supreme Court will likely depend on 
whether and when the Justice Department 
files an appeal in the Hobby Lobby case, 
they said. 
“I assume they are eager to get this thing 
resolved,” the Becket Fund’s Rienzi said. 
His organization represents Hobby Lobby. 
Justice could forego a quick appeal and let 
the issue continue to play out in lower 
courts. Neither the 3rd Circuit nor the 10th 
Circuit actually ruled on the merits of 
whether the contraception policy is 
constitutional, and similar lawsuits are still 
pending in two more circuits. 
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For either case to make it onto the docket in 
the court’s next term, Justice would need to 
file its appeal by about Sept. 25, legal 
observers said. 
If the court agrees to hear the case, oral 
arguments would likely take place early next 
year and a decision would come by next 
summer — about two years after the court’s 
landmark ruling upholding the law’s central 
provisions. 
“I’m just assuming that the court is going to 
hear one of these cases,” the ACLU’s 
Melling said. 
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“Hobby Lobby Wins a Stay Against Birth Control Mandate” 
Reuters 
Jonathan Stempel 
July 19, 2013 
A federal judge has temporarily exempted 
Hobby Lobby Stores Inc from a requirement 
in the 2010 healthcare law that it offer 
workers insurance coverage for birth 
control, which the retailer said violated its 
religious beliefs. 
The preliminary injunction issued by U.S. 
District Judge Joe Heaton in Oklahoma City, 
where Hobby Lobby is based, covers the arts 
and crafts chain and its affiliated Mardel 
Christian bookstore chain. 
He put the case on hold until October 1, 
giving the federal government time to decide 
whether to appeal a June 27 decision by a 
federal appeals court in Denver to let Hobby 
Lobby challenge the mandate on religious 
grounds. 
A U.S. Department of Justice spokesman 
had no immediate comment. The 
government has said contraception coverage 
is needed to promote public health and 
gender equality. 
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a 
nonprofit law firm representing Hobby 
Lobby, said there are 63 lawsuits nationwide 
challenging the mandate. 
It said Hobby Lobby is the largest company 
to be excused, at least temporarily, from 
having to comply. Hobby Lobby has 556 
stores in 45 U.S. states, and has about 
13,000 employees. 
The Green family, which owns Hobby 
Lobby, had argued that providing coverage 
to workers for the morning-after pill and 
similar contraceptives violated its Christian 
beliefs. 
It also said it could have under Obamacare 
faced $1.3 million in daily fines by not 
providing such coverage. 
In a written order, Heaton said the size of 
those penalties, the "substantial" public 
policy issues involved, and the amount of 
similar litigation justified an injunction for 
Hobby Lobby. 
"There is a substantial public interest in 
ensuring that no individual or corporation 
has their legs cut out from under them while 
these difficult issues are resolved," Heaton 
said at a hearing, according to the Becket 
Fund. 
In its June 27 ruling, the Denver appeals 
court said there was a good chance that 
Hobby Lobby would ultimately prevail. 
It said Hobby Lobby had "drawn a line at 
providing coverage for drugs or devices they 
consider to induce abortions, and it is not for 
us to question whether the line is 
reasonable." 
Lori Windham, senior counsel for the 
Becket Fund, said in an interview that 
Heaton's decision "shows that companies 
can be protected from the mandate, and 
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continue to exercise their religious beliefs in 
the way they run their businesses." 
The case is Hobby Lobby Stores Inc et al v. 
Sebelius et al, U.S. District Court, Western 
District of Oklahoma, No. 12-01000. 
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“Obama Contraceptive Mandate Upheld by U.S. Appeals Court” 
Bloomberg 
Tom Schoenberg 
July 27, 2013 
The Obama administration won an appeals 
court victory in a challenge to its 2010 
health-care law by a for-profit company 
seeking a religious exemption to a mandate 
that employers provide insurance coverage 
for contraceptives. 
In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
in Philadelphia yesterday rejected a 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act 
requirement brought by Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp., a cabinet maker owned by 
Mennonite Christians who argued the 
mandate violates their religious beliefs. 
“We simply conclude that the law has long 
recognized the distinction between the 
owners of a corporation and the corporation 
itself,” U.S. Circuit Judge Robert Cowen 
wrote in the majority decision. “A holding to 
the contrary -- that a for-profit corporation 
can engage in religious exercise -- would 
eviscerate the fundamental principle that a 
corporation is a legally distinct entity from 
its owners.” 
The ruling sets up a split between federal 
appeals courts that makes it more likely the 
U.S. Supreme Court will eventually consider 
the dispute. On June 27, a federal appeals 
court in Denver ruled that Hobby Lobby 
Stores Inc. was likely to win on the merits of 
its argument that the mandate violates the 
rights of the company and its owners under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and 
the First Amendment of the Constitution. 
Hobby Lobby 
A federal judge on July 19 issued a ruling 
blocking enforcement of the mandate 
against Hobby Lobby and put the case on 
hold until October. 
Conestoga and other companies challenged 
the government over the provision of the 
2010 U.S. health law requiring employers 
and insurers to provide preventive health 
services without charge to their workers, a 
category of service the administration said 
includes birth control. 
Thirty-six lawsuits have been filed by for-
profit companies challenging the Affordable 
Care Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate, 
according to the National Women’s Law 
Center. In at least 24 cases the plaintiffs 
have won rulings allowing them not to 
provide the coverage while the litigation is 
pending. In seven cases, the court has ruled 
against the companies’ request, according to 
the group. 
“Most courts agree that all Americans have 
religious freedom even when trying to earn a 
living and we think this decision will 
eventually be reviewed and that religious 
freedom will be vindicated,” Matt Bowman, 
a lawyer for Conestoga at the Washington-
based Alliance for Defending Freedom, said 
in an interview. 
‘Grievous Harm’ 
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In a 66-page dissent, Circuit Judge Kent 
Jordan said the majority’s ruling “guarantees 
grievous harm” as Conestoga’s owners are 
forced to pay for the “offending 
contraceptives, including abortifacients,” in 
violation of their religious convictions or 
face “ruinous fines.” 
“It should not be hard for us to join the 
many courts across the country that have 
looked at the mandate and its 
implementation and concluded that the 
government should be enjoined from telling 
sincere believers in the sanctity of life to put 
their consciences aside and support other 
people’s reproductive choices,” Jordan said. 
The case is Conestoga Wood Specialties 
Corp. v. Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, 13-1144, U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
(Philadelphia). 
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LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, INCORPORATED, a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation; Michele 
G. Waddell; Joanne V. Merrill, Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
and 
Martha A. Neal; David Stein, M.D.; Pausanias Alexander; Mary T. Bendorf; Delegate 
Kathy Byron; Jeff Helgeson, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Jacob LEW, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, in his official capacity; 
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, in her official capacity; Seth Harris, Acting Secretary of the United States 
Department of Labor, in his official capacity; Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the 
United States, in his official capacity, Defendants–Appellees. 
 United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 
Decided on July 11, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
MOTZ, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Juges: 
Liberty University and certain individuals 
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this 
action challenging two provisions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: 
the “individual mandate,” which requires 
individuals to purchase a minimum level of 
health insurance coverage, and the 
“employer mandate,” which requires certain 
employers to offer such coverage to their 
employees and their dependents. The district 
court dismissed the lawsuit, upholding the 
constitutionality of both mandates. On 
appeal we held that the Anti–Injunction Act 
barred us from considering Plaintiffs' claims 
and remanded the case to the district court 
with instructions to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted 
Plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, vacated our 
judgment, and remanded for further 
consideration in light of National 
Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius. After careful consideration of that 
case, we affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
I. 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama 
signed the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“Affordable Care Act” or “the 
Act”) into law. Liberty and two unaffiliated 
individuals challenge the individual 
mandate, which will become effective in 
2014, and the employer mandate, which will 
become effective in 2015. Before resolving 
the legal questions, we summarize the 
requirements of the mandates and the 
relevant facts and procedural history of this 
case. 
A. 
1. 
With limited exceptions, the individual 
mandate imposes a “penalty” on any 
taxpayer who is an “applicable individual” 
and fails to obtain “minimum essential 
coverage.”…  
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Any individual who does not qualify for a 
listed exemption is an “applicable 
individual.” The Act provides two religion-
based exemptions. The “[r]eligious 
conscience exemption” applies to an 
individual who is “a member of a 
recognized religious sect or division 
thereof,” and “an adherent of established 
tenets or teachings of such sect or division 
by reason of which he is conscientiously 
opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any 
[life, disability, old-age, retirement, or 
medical] insurance.” ]…  
The penalty for failing to obtain minimum 
essential coverage is tied to the individual's 
income but cannot exceed the cost of “the 
national average premium for qualified 
health plans” meeting a certain level of 
coverage…  
2. 
If an “applicable large employer” fails to 
provide affordable health care coverage to 
its full-time employees and their dependents, 
the employer mandate may require an 
“assessable payment” by the employer. The 
Act defines an “applicable large employer” 
as an employer who employed an average of 
at least fifty full-time employees during the 
preceding year. 
Such an employer must make an assessable 
payment if at least one of its full-time 
employees qualifies for “an applicable 
premium tax credit or cost-sharing 
reduction” to help pay for health care 
coverage. An employee is eligible for an 
“applicable premium tax credit” or “cost-
sharing reduction” if the employer fails to 
offer the employee “affordable” coverage 
providing “minimum value” and the 
employee's income falls between 100% and 
400% of the poverty line.  
The amount of the assessable payment that 
an employer required to make such a 
payment must pay depends on whether the 
employer offers “minimum essential 
coverage” to its full-time employees and 
their dependents. If the employer fails to 
offer such coverage, the assessable payment 
is calculated by multiplying $2000 by the 
number of full-time employees (less thirty), 
prorated over the number of months the 
employer is liable. If the employer does 
offer such coverage, the assessable payment 
is calculated by multiplying $3000 by the 
number of employees receiving an 
applicable premium tax credit or cost-
sharing reduction, prorated on a monthly 
basis…  
“Minimum essential coverage” includes 
coverage under an “eligible employer-
sponsored plan,” other than coverage of only 
certain excepted benefits (like limited scope 
dental or vision benefits), which does not 
qualify. An “eligible employer-sponsored 
plan” includes a “group health plan,” which 
is a plan established or maintained by an 
employer for the purpose of providing 
medical care to employees and their 
dependents. Thus, employer-provided health 
care coverage would seem to qualify as 
minimum essential coverage unless that 
coverage applies only to excepted benefits. 
In effect, then, § 4980H(a) imposes an 
assessable payment on an applicable 
employer who fails to offer coverage to its 
full-time employees and their dependents, 
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while § 4980H(b) imposes an assessable 
payment on an applicable employer who 
provides coverage that does not satisfy the 
mandate's affordability criteria. 
B. 
On March 23, 2010, the day the President 
signed the Affordable Care Act into law, 
Plaintiffs filed this action against the 
Secretary of the Treasury and other officials 
(collectively, “the Secretary”). Plaintiffs 
sought a declaration that the individual and 
employer mandates are invalid and an order 
enjoining their enforcement. 
1. 
In their second amended complaint, the 
individual plaintiffs, Michele G. Waddell 
and Joanne V. Merrill, assert that they have 
“made a personal choice not to purchase 
health insurance coverage and [do] not want 
to” do so… They also assert that they are 
Christians “who have sincerely held 
religious beliefs that abortions, except where 
necessary to save the life of the pregnant 
mother, are murder and morally repugnant” 
and that “they should play no part in such 
abortions, including no part in facilitating, 
subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting 
such abortions since to do so is evil and 
morally repugnant complicity.” 
Liberty alleges that it employs 
approximately 3900 full-time faculty and 
staff, and that it is self-insured and offers 
“health savings accounts, private insurance 
policies and other health care reimbursement 
options to qualified employees.” Liberty 
asserts that “depending upon how the federal 
government defines ‘minimum essential 
coverage’ and the affordability index,” the 
University could be found to offer coverage 
insufficient “to satisfy the federal definition 
of minimum essential coverage or coverage 
that is deemed unaffordable ... and therefore 
could be subjected to significant penalties” 
and “substantial financial hardship.”…  
Finally, Liberty asserts that it “is a Christian 
educational institution whose employees are 
Christians who have sincerely held religious 
beliefs that abortions, except where 
necessary to save the life of the pregnant 
mother, are murder and morally repugnant.” 
It further explains that its religious beliefs 
bar it from “play[ing][any] part in abortions, 
including [any] part in facilitating, 
subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting 
abortions since to do so is evil and morally 
repugnant complicity.” 
2. 
Before the district court, Plaintiffs asserted 
that the individual and employer mandates 
exceeded Congress's Article I powers and 
violated the Tenth Amendment, the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of 
the First Amendment, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, the Fifth 
Amendment, the right to free speech and 
free association under the First Amendment, 
the Article I, Section 9 prohibition against 
unapportioned capitation or direct taxes, and 
the Guarantee Clause. The Secretary moved 
to dismiss the second amended complaint 
for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that 
Plaintiffs lacked standing and that the Anti–
Injunction Act barred the suit. Alternatively, 
the Secretary moved to dismiss all counts 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
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could be granted. The district court 
concluded that it possessed jurisdiction but 
granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed 
only as to the Article I, Establishment 
Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, and Fifth 
Amendment claims. 
When we considered the case on appeal, we 
did not reach the merits of those claims 
because we concluded that the Anti–
Injunction Act deprived us of jurisdiction…  
On remand, we must decide whether the 
Anti–Injunction Act bars this pre-
enforcement challenge to the employer 
mandate, and whether Plaintiffs have 
standing to challenge the mandates. If 
neither jurisdictional hurdle prevents our 
consideration of the merits of the case, we 
must determine whether Congress acted 
within the scope of its constitutionally 
delegated powers when it enacted the 
employer mandate. Finally, if we find that 
the mandates are a valid exercise of 
Congress's Article I powers, we must 
address Plaintiffs' religion-based arguments. 
Our review is de novo.  
II. 
The Anti–Injunction Act (“AIA”) provides 
that “no suit for the purpose of restraining 
the assessment or collection of any tax shall 
be maintained in any court by any person.” 
Where it applies, the AIA thus deprives 
courts of jurisdiction to entertain pre-
enforcement suits seeking to enjoin the 
collection of federal taxes.  
Liberty's challenge to the employer mandate 
is a pre-enforcement suit to enjoin the 
collection of an exaction that is codified in 
the Internal Revenue Code, and which the 
Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to 
collect in the same manner as a tax. In 
NFIB, however, the Supreme Court made 
clear that […] the AIA applies only where 
Congress intends it to.  
When concluding that Congress did not 
intend to bar pre-enforcement challenges to 
the individual mandate, the Court in NFIB 
found it most significant that Congress 
chose to describe the shared responsibility 
payment as a “penalty” rather than a “tax.” 
Thus, we begin our AIA inquiry with 
particular attention to how Congress 
characterized the exaction set forth in the 
employer mandate. 
In maintaining that the AIA bars this 
challenge to the employer mandate, the 
Secretary relies heavily on the fact that the 
Act twice refers to the employer mandate 
exaction as a “tax.” In doing so, the 
Secretary virtually ignores the fact that the 
Act does not consistently characterize the 
exaction as a tax. Rather, the Act initially 
identifies the employer mandate exaction as 
an “assessable payment.” The Act then 
proceeds to characterize the exaction as an 
“assessable payment” six more times…  
Because Congress initially and primarily 
refers to the exaction as an “assessable 
payment” and not a “tax,” the statutory text 
suggests that Congress did not intend the 
exaction to be treated as a tax for purposes 
of the AIA. 
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Furthermore, Congress did not otherwise 
indicate that the employer mandate exaction 
qualifies as a tax for AIA purposes, though 
of course it could have done so…  
Finally, we note that to adopt the Secretary's 
position would lead to an anomalous result. 
The Supreme Court has expressly held that a 
person subject to the individual mandate can 
bring a pre-enforcement suit challenging 
that provision. But, under the Secretary's 
theory, an employer subject to the employer 
mandate could bring only a post-
enforcement suit challenging that provision. 
It seems highly unlikely that Congress 
meant to signal—with two isolated 
references to the term “tax”—that the 
mandates should be treated differently for 
purposes of the AIA's applicability. 
Tellingly, the Government has pointed to no 
rationale supporting such differential 
treatment. 
For these reasons, we hold that the employer 
mandate exaction, like the individual 
mandate exaction, does not constitute a tax 
for purposes of the AIA. Therefore, the AIA 
does not bar this suit. 
III. 
The Secretary argues that another 
jurisdictional hurdle—standing—prevents 
our consideration of the merits of this case. 
To establish standing at the motion to 
dismiss stage, a plaintiff must plausibly 
allege that: “(1) it has suffered an injury in 
fact that is (a) concrete and particularized 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.” The 
Secretary contends that all plaintiffs lack 
standing because they allege no actual or 
imminent injury. We address first Liberty's 
standing and then that of the individual 
plaintiffs. 
A. 
Liberty has more than fifty full-time 
employees, and the Secretary does not 
contest that it is an “applicable large 
employer” subject to the employer 
mandate... [T]he Secretary contends that the 
health care coverage Liberty acknowledges 
it already provides to its employees qualifies 
as minimum essential coverage that may 
also satisfy the employer mandate's 
affordability criteria. 
The Secretary's argument may well be 
correct—as far as it goes. But Liberty need 
not show that it will be subject to an 
assessable payment to establish standing if it 
otherwise alleges facts that establish 
standing. In this case, in addition to alleging 
that it “could” be subject to an assessable 
payment, Liberty alleges that the employer 
mandate and its “attendant burdensome 
regulations will ... increase the cost of care” 
and “directly and negatively affect [it] by 
increasing the cost of providing health 
insurance coverage.”… 
[T]o establish standing, Liberty need not 
prove that the employer mandate will 
increase its costs of providing health 
coverage; it need only plausibly allege that it 
will. 
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Liberty's allegation to this effect is plausible. 
Even if the coverage Liberty currently 
provides ultimately proves sufficient, it may 
well incur additional costs because of the 
administrative burden of assuring 
compliance with the employer mandate, or 
due to an increase in the cost of care.  
Moreover, Liberty's injury is imminent even 
though the employer mandate will not go 
into effect until January 1, 2015, as Liberty 
must take measures to ensure compliance in 
advance of that date. Thus, Liberty has 
standing to challenge the employer mandate. 
B. 
The individual plaintiffs, after alleging that 
they do not have or want to purchase health 
insurance coverage, assert that the individual 
mandate “will create a financial hardship in 
that [they] will have to either pay for health 
insurance coverage ... or face significant 
penalties.” 
The Secretary maintains that the individual 
plaintiffs lack standing because they may be 
exempt from the individual mandate penalty, 
either because their income is below the 
mandate's threshold level or because they 
qualify for a proposed hardship exemption. 
But, again, at this early stage, plaintiffs need 
only provide “general factual allegations of 
injury.”  
The individual plaintiffs allege the 
individual mandate will obligate them to buy 
insurance or pay a penalty, and their alleged 
lack of insurance provides sufficient support 
for that allegation at this stage of the 
proceedings. Further, the individual 
plaintiffs' injury is imminent because they 
must make preparations to obtain insurance 
before the mandate goes into effect.  
Thus, we conclude that the individual 
plaintiffs have standing to challenge the 
individual mandate. We therefore proceed to 
the merits. 
IV. 
A. 
Liberty argues that the employer mandate 
exceeds Congress's commerce power 
because Congress does not have “the power 
to order employers to provide government-
defined health insurance to their 
employees.” This is so, Liberty contends, 
because the employer mandate “compel[s] 
employers to engage in particular conduct or 
purchase an unwanted product,” contrary to 
the dictates of NFIB…  
The Secretary counters that the employer 
mandate is a valid exercise of Congress's 
authority under the Commerce Clause 
because “[h]ealth coverage benefits form 
part of an employee's compensation 
package, and ‘it is well-established in 
Supreme Court precedent that Congress has 
the power to regulate the terms and 
conditions of employment.” ’..  
[The Secretary argues that] “[t]he provision 
of health coverage substantially affects 
commerce just as other forms of 
compensation and terms of employment do, 
and the businesses run by large employers 
likewise substantially affect commerce.” We 
think the Secretary has the better argument. 
B. 
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“[T]he determinative test of the exercise of 
power by the Congress under the Commerce 
Clause is simply whether the activity sought 
to be regulated is commerce which concerns 
more States than one and has a real and 
substantial relation to the national interest .” 
“The power of Congress in this field is 
broad and sweeping ....“ “[T]he power to 
regulate commerce is the power to enact all 
appropriate legislation for its protection or 
advancement; to adopt measures to promote 
its growth and insure its safety; to foster, 
protect, control, and restrain.”…  
To be sure, Congress's authority under the 
Commerce Clause is not without limits… 
Although “[t]here has been considerable 
debate about whether the statements [in 
NFIB ] about the Commerce Clause are 
dicta or binding precedent,” these five 
justices agreed that the Commerce Clause 
does not grant Congress the authority to 
“compel” or “mandate” an individual to 
enter commerce by purchasing a good or 
service. Rather, these justices concluded that 
the Commerce Clause permits Congress to 
regulate only existing activity. 
Chief Justice Roberts's—and, to a large 
degree, the joint dissenters'—analysis 
focused on the text of the Commerce Clause, 
the Court's cases interpreting that clause, 
and the practical effect and operation of the 
individual mandate. As to the text, Chief 
Justice Roberts noted that the Commerce 
Clause “grants Congress the power to 
‘regulate Commerce.’”… 
As to the Court's prior cases, the Chief 
Justice noted that “all have one thing in 
common: They uniformly describe the 
power as reaching ‘activity.’ “The joint 
dissenters similarly distinguished the 
Commerce Clause cases on which the 
government relied as “involv[ing] 
commercial activity,” and “not 
represent[ing] the expansion of the federal 
power to direct into a broad new field,”  
Finally, both Chief Justice Roberts and the 
joint dissenters expressed substantial 
concern about the practical and operational 
effects of the individual mandate. Chief 
Justice Roberts suggested that construing the 
commerce power to allow Congress to 
mandate the purchase of health insurance 
would “permit Congress to regulate 
individuals precisely because they are doing 
nothing,” and “would bring countless 
decisions an individual could potentially 
make within the scope of federal regulation 
....” 
C. 
For the reasons set forth within, we find that 
the employer mandate is no monster; rather, 
it is simply another example of Congress's 
longstanding authority to regulate employee 
compensation offered and paid for by 
employers in interstate commerce. To begin, 
we note that unlike the individual mandate 
(as construed by five justices in NFIB ), the 
employer mandate does not seek to create 
commerce in order to regulate it. In contrast 
to individuals, all employers are, by their 
very nature, engaged in economic activity. 
All employers are in the market for labor. 
And to the extent that the employer mandate 
compels employers in interstate commerce 
to do something, it does not compel them to 
“become active in commerce.” Liberty fails 
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to recognize the distinction between 
individuals not otherwise engaged in 
commerce and employers necessarily so 
engaged… 
Having found that the provision regulates 
existing economic activity (employee 
compensation), and therefore stands on quite 
a different footing from the individual 
mandate, we further conclude that the 
employer mandate is a valid exercise of 
Congress's authority under the Commerce 
Clause. It has long been settled that 
Congress may impose conditions on terms 
of employment that substantially affect 
interstate commerce. Here, Congress did 
both. 
First, the employer mandate regulates a term 
of employment (compensation) that 
substantially affects interstate commerce…  
“[E]mployers who do not offer health 
insurance to their workers gain an unfair 
economic advantage relative to those 
employers who do provide coverage,” and 
perpetuate a “vicious cycle,”: “uninsured 
workers turn to emergency rooms for health 
care” they cannot afford; “health care 
providers pass on the cost [of the 
uncompensated care] to private insurers;” 
and insurers “pass on the cost to families” 
through premium increases, making it more 
expensive—and thus, more difficult—for 
employers to insure their employees…  
Second, the employer mandate regulates an 
activity (employee compensation) that 
substantially affects workers' interstate 
mobility. The availability and breadth of 
employer-sponsored health coverage varies, 
and “[t]he availability of health insurance 
options can affect people's incentives to 
enter the labor force, work fewer or more 
hours, retire, change jobs, or even prefer 
certain types of firms or jobs.”… Thus, 
health insurance provided as part of 
employee compensation substantially affects 
interstate mobility, and thereby interstate 
commerce. 
Our recognition of Congress's authority to 
enact the employer mandate does not “open 
a new and potentially vast domain to 
congressional authority,” or “enable the 
Federal Government to regulate all private 
conduct.” Requiring employers to offer their 
employees a certain level of compensation 
through health insurance coverage is akin to 
requiring employers to pay their workers a 
minimum wage, or “time and a half for 
overtime.” Thus, our conclusion fits 
squarely within the existing core of the 
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, including 
the admonition of five justices in NFIB that 
Congress may not, through its commerce 
power, seek to create commerce in order to 
regulate it. 
D. 
For all these reasons, we conclude that 
Congress had a rational basis for finding that 
employers' provision of health insurance 
coverage substantially affects interstate 
commerce, and Congress's regulation of this 
activity does not run afoul of NFIB's 
teachings. Accordingly, we hold that the 
employer mandate is a valid exercise of 
Congress's authority under the Commerce 
Clause. 
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V. 
A. 
Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he Taxing and 
Spending or General Welfare Clause does 
not vest Congress with the authority to enact 
the [individual and employer] mandates.” 
But in NFIB, the Supreme Court held that 
the individual mandate exaction constituted 
a tax and that Congress acted well within the 
scope of its constitutionally granted 
authority in imposing it. Clearly, then, 
Plaintiffs' contention fails with regard to the 
individual mandate. And although NFIB did 
not present the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to address the constitutionality 
of the employer mandate, we are convinced 
that the NFIB taxing power analysis 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the 
employer mandate exaction, too, is a 
constitutional tax. 
B. 
…The Supreme Court has defined a tax as a 
“pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or 
property for the purpose of supporting the 
government,” and described Congress's 
taxing power as “very extensive.”  
In NFIB, the Supreme Court gleaned from 
precedent a “functional approach” for 
determining whether an exaction, whatever 
Congress calls it, constitutes a tax. Under 
that approach, the “essential feature” of any 
tax is that “it produces at least some revenue 
for the Government.”…  
The Court did [] attempt to distinguish taxes 
from penalties, explaining that “if the 
concept of penalty means anything, it means 
punishment for an unlawful act or 
omission.”  
C. 
First, we examine the factors the Supreme 
Court considered in upholding the individual 
mandate exaction as a constitutional tax. In 
applying its “functional approach” to that 
exaction, the Supreme Court concluded that 
it “looks like a tax in many respects.” First 
and foremost, it will produce “at least some 
revenue for the Government”—namely 
“about $4 billion per year by 2017.” Further 
attributes that convinced the Supreme Court 
that the individual mandate exaction 
constitutes a tax include: its “pa [yment] into 
the Treasury by taxpayers when they file 
their tax returns”; the fact that “its amount is 
determined by such familiar factors as 
taxable income, number of dependents, and 
joint filing status”; and its inclusion “in the 
Internal Revenue Code and enforce[ment] 
by the IRS, which ... must assess and collect 
it in the same manner as taxes.” The 
Supreme Court also distinguished the 
individual mandate tax from an exaction the 
Court invalidated as an impermissible 
penalty in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. 
The Court noted that the individual mandate, 
unlike the provision at issue in Drexel, 
contains no scienter requirement and does 
not constitute “prohibitory financial 
punishment.”…  
Finally, the Supreme Court swiftly dispelled 
any notion that the individual mandate 
constituted a direct tax subject to the 
constitutional apportionment requirement. 
Having recognized only two types of direct 
taxes—those on individuals as individuals 
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and those on property—the Supreme Court 
held that the individual mandate payment 
fits into neither category.  
At the end of the day, the Supreme Court 
concluded that when an exaction “need not 
be read to do more than impose a tax[,]” 
“[t]hat is sufficient to sustain it.” The Court 
held that because the Affordable Care Act's 
individual mandate could be read simply as 
imposing a tax, Congress had the power to 
enact it. The Supreme Court thus squarely 
rejected Plaintiffs' contention that the 
individual mandate exaction is not a 
constitutional tax. 
D. 
Turning now to the employer mandate, it is 
clear from the provision's face that it 
possesses the “essential feature” of any tax: 
“it produces at least some revenue for the 
Government.” Indeed, the Congressional 
Budget Office estimated that the employer 
mandate exaction will generate $11 billion 
annually by 2019.  
Looking beyond the “essential feature” to 
other “functional” characteristics, the 
exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes 
on large employers “looks like a tax in many 
respects.” The exaction is paid into the 
Treasury, “found in the Internal Revenue 
Code[,] and enforced by the IRS,” which 
“must assess and collect it in the same 
manner as” a tax. Further, the employer 
mandate lacks a scienter requirement, does 
not punish unlawful conduct, and leaves 
large employers with a choice for complying 
with the law—provide adequate, affordable 
health coverage to employees or pay a tax. 
And finally, because the exaction taxes 
neither individuals as such nor property, it is 
not a direct tax subject to the apportionment 
requirement.  
Relying exclusively on Drexel, Liberty 
contends that the employer mandate 
exaction nevertheless “cross[es] the line” 
from a reasonable payment to a “potentially 
destructive” unconstitutional penalty. Fatally 
for Liberty's argument, Drexel is easily 
distinguishable from the case at hand. 
In Drexel, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
“so-called tax on employing child laborers” 
as an impermissible penalty. The Supreme 
Court did so ostensibly because the penalty: 
(1) carried a scienter requirement “typical of 
punitive statutes, because Congress often 
wishes to punish only those who 
intentionally break the law”; (2) imposed an 
“exceedingly heavy” financial burden—10 
percent of an offender's net income—even if 
the offender employed only one child 
laborer for only one day of the year; and (3) 
was enforced at least in part by the 
Department of Labor, an agency responsible 
not for collecting revenue but rather for 
punishing labor law violations. In stark 
contrast to the penalty the Court struck 
down in Drexel, the employer mandate 
exaction is devoid of any scienter 
requirement and does not punish unlawful 
behavior. Further, the exaction is collected 
by the Secretary of the Treasury in the same 
manner as a tax…  
We therefore reject Liberty's argument that 
the employer mandate imposes a penalty 
rather than a tax. 
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E. 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has 
already upheld the individual mandate 
exaction as a constitutional tax. Similarly, 
the employer mandate exaction “need not be 
read to do more than impose a tax.” 
Accordingly, Congress had the power to 
enact it, and we must uphold it. For these 
reasons, as well as those provided supra in 
Part IV, we reject Plaintiffs' contention that 
Congress lacked authority under Article I of 
the Constitution to enact the employer 
mandate. 
VI. 
Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the Act on 
various religion-based grounds. In their 
second amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege 
that the Act violates their rights under the 
First and Fifth Amendments and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”). For the first time on this appeal, 
they also seek to challenge on religious 
grounds certain regulations implementing 
the Act. We initially consider the claims 
alleged in the second amended complaint 
and then those raised for the first time on 
this appeal. 
A. 
1. 
Plaintiffs maintain that both the employer 
mandate and the individual mandate violate 
their free exercise rights under the First 
Amendment and RFRA. Specifically, they 
allege that the mandates unlawfully force 
them to violate their religious belief that 
“they should play ... no part in facilitating, 
subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting 
... abortions.” 
The Free Exercise Clause provides that 
“Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting 
the free exercise” of religion. However, the 
Clause does not compel Congress to exempt 
religious practices from a “valid and neutral 
law of general applicability.”…  
A neutral law of general applicability thus 
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
The Act is just such a law. It has no object 
that “infringe[s] upon or restrict[s] practices 
because of their religious motivation,” and 
imposes no “burden[ ] only on conduct 
motivated by religious belief.”…  
[B]y its own terms, RFRA directs 
application of strict scrutiny only if the 
Government “substantially burden[s]” 
religious practice. A substantial burden, in 
turn, requires “substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs.”  
Plaintiffs present no plausible claim that the 
Act substantially burdens their free exercise 
of religion, by forcing them to facilitate or 
support abortion or otherwise. The Act 
specifically provides individuals the option 
to purchase a plan that covers no abortion 
services except those for cases of rape or 
incest, or where the life of the mother would 
be endangered… Furthermore, the Act 
allows an individual to obtain, and an 
employer to offer, a plan that covers no 
abortion services at all, not even excepted 
services.  
Given that the mandates themselves impose 
no substantial burden, the option of paying a 
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tax to avoid the mandates' requirements 
certainly imposes no substantial burden. On 
the contrary, this option underscores the 
“lawful choice” Plaintiffs have to avoid any 
coverage they might consider objectionable.  
To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the tax 
payment itself is a substantial burden, as the 
district court explained, the Act “contains 
strict safeguards at multiple levels to prevent 
federal funds from being used to pay for 
[non-excepted] abortion services.”…  
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' free exercise 
claims—both under the Constitution and 
under RFRA—fail. 
2. 
Plaintiffs also allege that the two religious 
exemptions in the Act violate the 
Establishment Clause and their Fifth 
Amendment equal protection rights. Of 
course, the mere existence of religious 
exemptions in a statute poses no 
constitutional problem. Rather, the 
Constitution freely permits exemptions that 
will allow “religious exercise to exist 
without sponsorship and without 
interference.” Permissible benevolence 
morphs into impermissible sponsorship only 
when the “proposed accommodation singles 
out a particular religious sect for special 
treatment.” Thus, a court applies strict 
scrutiny only to statutes that “make [ ] 
explicit and deliberate distinctions between 
different religious organizations.”  
A statute without such distinctions, even one 
that has a disparate impact on different 
denominations, need only satisfy the less 
rigorous test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 
The Lemon test requires “a secular 
legislative purpose,” a “principal or primary 
effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion,” and no “excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”  
The first exemption Plaintiffs challenge is 
the individual mandate's religious 
conscience exemption. Plaintiffs maintain 
that this exemption discriminates against 
their religious practice by applying only to 
sects that conscientiously oppose all 
insurance benefits, provide for their own 
members, and were established before 
December 31, 1950. The religious 
conscience exemption adopts an exemption 
of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 
under 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g), which courts 
have consistently found constitutional under 
the Establishment Clause and the Fifth 
Amendment. As the Supreme Court 
explained with respect to the § 1402(g) 
exemption, “Congress granted an exemption 
... [to] a narrow category which was readily 
identifiable,” i.e., “persons in a religious 
community having its own ‘welfare’ 
system.”…  
The exemption passes the Lemon test 
because it has a secular purpose: “to ensure 
that all persons are provided for, either by 
the [Act's insurance] system or by their 
church.” The exemption's principal effects 
also neither advance nor inhibit religion, but 
only assure that all individuals are covered, 
one way or the other…  
The second individual mandate exemption 
challenged by Plaintiffs is the health care 
sharing ministry exemption. Plaintiffs 
maintain that it unconstitutionally selects an 
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arbitrary formation date of December 31, 
1999 as the eligibility cutoff. But even if the 
exemption's cutoff date is arbitrary, it is not 
unconstitutional. For neither the cutoff's text 
nor its history suggests any deliberate 
attempt to distinguish between particular 
religious groups. Accordingly, the cutoff 
need only satisfy the Lemon test.  
Applying Lemon, the date serves at least two 
“secular legislative purpose[s].” First, the 
cutoff ensures that the ministries provide 
care that possesses the reliability that comes 
with historical practice. Second, it 
accommodates religious health care without 
opening the floodgates for any group to 
establish a new ministry to circumvent the 
Act. The “primary effect” of the cutoff 
accordingly “neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.” Further, given that it applies only 
secular criteria, the cutoff does not “foster 
an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.”  
Plaintiffs additionally contend that both the 
religious conscience exemption and the 
health care sharing ministry exemption 
violate their Fifth Amendment equal 
protection rights. In furtherance of this 
argument they maintain that both 
exemptions are subject to the heightened 
scrutiny that applies “if the plaintiff can 
show the basis for the distinction was 
religious ... in nature.” Here, the distinction 
made between sects that oppose insurance 
and provide for themselves in their own 
welfare system and those that do not, and 
the distinction made between ministries 
formed before 1999 and those formed after, 
are secular and thus subject only to rational 
basis review. Both distinctions are rationally 
related to the Government's legitimate 
interest in accommodating religious practice 
while limiting interference in the Act's 
overriding purposes. 
We therefore conclude that Plaintiffs have 
failed to state any plausible claim that the 
Establishment Clause or the Fifth 
Amendment provide a basis for relief. 
B. 
In their recent post-remand briefs, Plaintiffs 
argue at length that certain regulations 
implementing neither the individual nor the 
employer mandate but another portion of the 
Act- § 1001 violate their religious rights. 
These new regulations require group health 
plans to cover all FDA-approved 
contraceptive methods.  
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint 
mentions neither § 1001 of the Affordable 
Care Act nor 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13. 
Further, the complaint does not mention 
contraception. To be sure, the complaint 
specifies that Plaintiffs have “sincerely held 
religious beliefs that abortions ... are murder 
and ... they should play ... no part in 
facilitating, subsidizing, easing, funding, or 
supporting ... abortions.” But the complaint 
gives no notice that Plaintiffs challenge 
methods of contraception or include within 
their challenge to “abortion” all the forms of 
contraception they now label 
“abortifacients.” 
Moreover, Plaintiffs did not challenge these 
regulations, or make any argument related to 
contraception or abortifacients, in the district 
court, in their first appeal before us, or in 
their Supreme Court briefs. The Supreme 
 87 
Court in turn ordered a limited remand […] 
which did not discuss this issue.  
Nevertheless, for the first time in their post-
remand briefs, Plaintiffs seek to challenge 
these regulations. Generally, “a federal 
appellate court does not consider an issue 
not passed upon below.”  
Of course, in our discretion, we can make 
“[e]xceptions to this general rule” but we do 
so “only in very limited circumstances.” The 
Supreme Court has explained that we are 
“justified” in making such an exception 
when the “proper resolution is beyond any 
doubt” or “injustice might otherwise result.” 
We have also recognized that certain other 
“limited circumstances” may justify such 
action, e.g., when refusal to do so would 
constitute plain error or result in a 
fundamental miscarriage of justice, or where 
there is an intervening change in the case 
law. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that any of these 
“limited circumstances” apply here. There is 
good reason for this; none does…  
Finding no circumstance justifying a 
premature resolution of Plaintiffs' new 
arguments and compelling reasons for 
refusing to do so in this case, we decline to 
reach Plaintiffs' challenge to the new 
regulations. 
VII. 
In sum, in light of the Supreme Court's 
teachings in NFIB, we hold that we have 
jurisdiction to decide this case. On the 
merits, we affirm the judgment of the district 
court dismissing the complaint in its entirety 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
AFFIRMED 
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“Court Rejects Obamacare Challenge by Christian College” 
Reuters 
Jonathan Stempel 
July 11, 2013 
A U.S. appeals court on Thursday rejected a 
Christian university's challenge to President 
Barack Obama's 2010 healthcare overhaul, 
which the school said unconstitutionally 
imposes costly burdens on large employers 
and infringes religious liberty. 
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Richmond, Virginia, rejected Liberty 
University's argument that the law violated 
the constitution's Commerce Clause by 
forcing large employers to provide health 
insurance to full-time workers and violated 
First Amendment religious protections by 
subsidizing abortions. 
The 3-0 panel decision addressed issues that 
the U.S. Supreme Court did not take up in 
June 2012, when by a 5-4 vote it upheld 
most of the healthcare law known as 
"Obamacare." 
In that case, the court upheld the individual 
mandate requiring people to buy insurance 
or pay a tax. It said the mandate was a valid 
exercise of Congress' taxing power, though 
it exceeded Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause. 
Mathew Staver, the dean of Liberty's law 
school, said in a phone interview that the 
university plans to appeal the decision to the 
Supreme Court this month. 
"It goes against the principle that the 
Supreme Court laid down that Congress 
cannot force individuals to buy an unwanted 
product," he said. "We believe the same 
principle applies to employers. If we win on 
the employer mandate, then the mandate 
would be gone for religious and non-
religious employers." 
The U.S. Department of Justice, which 
defended the law at the 4th Circuit, was not 
immediately available for comment. 
Dozens of groups and individuals supported 
either Liberty or the federal government 
during the appeals process. 
Liberty, based in Lynchburg, Virginia, was 
founded by the late U.S. evangelist Jerry 
Falwell. It had filed its lawsuit shortly after 
Obama signed the healthcare law in 2010. 
EMPLOYER MANDATE NOT A 
"MONSTER" 
In its decision, the 4th Circuit said the 
employer mandate does not require 
employers to buy a product they do not 
want, saying that employers are free to and 
often do self-insure. 
It also said Congress had a rational basis for 
the mandate because it substantially affects 
how easily workers can move from state to 
state. The court also rejected the argument 
that the mandate imposes a penalty rather 
than a tax. 
"The employer mandate is no monster; 
rather, it is simply another example of 
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Congress's longstanding authority to 
regulate employee compensation offered and 
paid for by employers in interstate 
commerce," the panel said. 
In finding that the law did not violate the 
right to freely exercise religion, the 4th 
Circuit said the law let individuals and 
employers use plans that do not cover 
abortion services except in cases of rape or 
incest or to protect a mother's life. 
Circuit Judges Diana Gribbon Motz, Andre 
Davis and James Wynn, all appointed by 
Democratic presidents, co-wrote the 
decision. Most federal appeals court 
decisions are written by one judge or are 
unsigned. 
"It is unusual," Staver said. "I think there 
was tension among the panel in terms of the 
direction it wanted to go, and it needed a 
joint decision to get a consensus." 
The 4th Circuit had in 2011 dismissed 
Liberty's case, saying it lacked jurisdiction, 
but was ordered by the Supreme Court to 
revisit the matter. 
Before the Supreme Court sent the case 
back, the Obama administration said 
Liberty's lawsuit lacked merit, but that it had 
no objection to letting the appeals court 
consider it. 
Obamacare has spawned many other 
lawsuits. More than 60 oppose a 
requirement that employers provide birth 
control coverage, according to the Becket 
Fund for Religious Liberty, a nonprofit law 
firm. 
The case is Liberty University Inc et al v. 
Lew et al, 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
No. 10-2347. 
  
 90 
“Fourth Circuit’s Liberty Ruling Deals a Hidden Blow to Obamacare” 
Cato Institute 
Michael F. Cannon 
July 12, 2013 
Obamacare had a rough day in court 
yesterday. In Liberty University v. Lew, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
ruled against Liberty University’s challenge 
to various aspects of the law. One might 
think, as SCOTUSblog reported, this was a 
victory for the Obama administration.  
In the process, however, the Fourth Circuit 
undercut three arguments the administration 
hopes will derail two lawsuits that pose an 
even greater threat to Obamacare’s survival, 
Pruitt v. Sebelius and Halbig v. Sebelius.  
The plaintiffs in both Pruitt and Halbig 
claim, correctly, that Obamacare forbids the 
administration to issue the law’s “premium 
assistance tax credits” in the 34 states that 
have refused to establish a health insurance 
“exchange.” The Pruitt and Halbig plaintiffs 
further claim that the administration’s plans 
to issue those tax credits in those 34 states 
anyway, contrary to the statute, injures them 
in a number of ways. One of those injuries is 
that the illegal tax credits would subject the 
employer-plaintiffs to penalties under 
Obamacare’s employer mandate, from 
which they should be exempt. (The event 
that triggers penalties against an employer is 
when one of its workers receives a tax 
credit. If there are no tax credits, there can 
be no penalties. Therefore, under the statute, 
when those 34 states opted not to establish 
exchanges, they effectively exempted their 
employers from those penalties.) 
The Obama administration has moved to 
dismiss Pruitt and Halbig on a number of 
grounds. First, it argues that those penalties 
are a tax, and the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) 
prevents taxpayers from challenging the 
imposition of a tax before it is assessed. 
Second, the administration argues that the 
injuries claimed by the employer-plaintiffs 
are too speculative to establish standing. 
Third, shortly after announcing it would 
effectively repeal the employer penalties 
until 2015, the administration wrote the 
Liberty, Pruitt, and Halbig courts to argue 
that the delay should (at the very least) delay 
the courts’ consideration of those cases. In 
Liberty, the Fourth Circuit rejected all of 
those claims. 
In discussing whether the “assessible 
payment” that the employer mandate 
imposes on non-compliant employers falls 
under the AIA, the court writes: 
Because Congress initially and 
primarily refers to the exaction as an 
“assessable payment” and not a 
“tax,” the statutory text suggests that 
Congress did not intend the exaction 
to be treated as a tax for purposes of 
the AIA. 
Furthermore, Congress did not 
otherwise indicate that the employer 
mandate exaction qualifies as a tax 
for AIA purposes, though of course 
it could have done so. As the 
Supreme Court pointed out in NFIB, 
26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) provides that the 
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“penalties and liabilities” found in 
subchapter 68B of the Internal 
Revenue Code are “treated as taxes” 
for purposes of the AIA. The 
employer mandate, like the 
individual mandate, is not included 
in subchapter 68B, and no other 
provision indicates that we are to 
treat its “assessable payment” as a 
tax.  
Finally, we note that to adopt the 
Secretary’s position would lead to an 
anomalous result. The Supreme 
Court has expressly held that a 
person subject to the individual 
mandate can bring a pre-enforcement 
suit challenging that provision. But, 
under the Secretary’s theory, an 
employer subject to the employer 
mandate could bring only a post-
enforcement suit challenging that 
provision. It seems highly unlikely 
that Congress meant to signal–with 
two isolated references to the term 
“tax”–-that the mandates should be 
treated differently for purposes of the 
AIA’s applicability. Tellingly, the 
Government has pointed to no 
rationale supporting such differential 
treatment. 
For these reasons, we hold that the 
employer mandate exaction, like the 
individual mandate exaction, does 
not constitute a tax for purposes of 
the AIA. Therefore, the AIA does 
not bar this suit. 
It is worth mentioning that the Pruitt and 
Halbig plaintiffs aren’t even asking the 
courts to enjoin the collection of the 
penalties. The penalties are merely one of 
the injuries they suffer. The relief they seek 
is to block the illegal tax credits, without 
which no penalty can be assessed. But even 
if we pretend (as the government does) that 
they are trying to block the collection of a 
tax, the federal district courts for the Eastern 
District of Oklahoma (Pruitt) and the 
District of Columbia (Halbig) may now rely 
on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Liberty to 
reject the argument that the AIA applies to 
the employer mandate. 
As in Pruitt and Halbig, the administration 
also argued that Liberty University could not 
challenge the employer mandate because the 
university hadn’t proved it would be 
assessed a penalty. The court responded: 
“[T]o establish standing, Liberty need not 
prove that the employer mandate will 
increase its costs of providing health 
coverage; it need only plausibly allege that it 
will.” 
Liberty’s allegation to this effect is 
plausible. Even if the coverage Liberty 
currently provides ultimately proves 
sufficient, it may well incur additional costs 
because of the administrative burden of 
assuring compliance with the employer 
mandate, or due to an increase in the cost of 
care. 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the 
administration’s argument that the delay of 
the employer mandate should delay 
challenges to the mandate: 
Liberty’s injury is imminent even 
though the employer mandate will 
not go into effect until January 1, 
2015, as Liberty must take measures 
to ensure compliance in advance of 
that date. 
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If anything the delay may increase the 
likelihood that the Pruitt and Halbig 
employer-plaintiffs will establish standing. 
In response to the government’s employer-
mandate-delay argument in Pruitt, 
Oklahoma’s solicitor general argued that the 
delay actually validates the State of 
Oklahoma’s claim that it is injured by the 
mandate: 
The federal government’s decision to 
delay implementation of the 
reporting and other regulatory 
requirements it seeks to impose on 
large employers in Oklahoma 
confirms what the State has been 
saying all along: those reporting and 
other requirements are burdensome, 
onerous, and injurious to it and every 
other large employer in the state. In 
fact, the IRS has justified the delay 
by noting that large employers 
nationwide are finding it impossible 
to understand and comply with the 
baffling array of new requirements… 
The State has argued it has standing 
in this case as a result of having to 
comply with the very reporting and 
other requirements that caused this 
delay. Despite having apparently 
known about the severity of the 
problems for “several months,” to 
this Court the federal government 
has downplayed the burden imposed 
by those reporting requirements, and 
has argued that those requirements 
do no harm to large employers like 
the State. Now, however, they have 
publically acknowledged that the 
requirements are so “complex” that 
large employers need a full year to 
figure out how to comply. The delay 
is at least an implicit admission by 
the federal government that the 
reporting requirements and other 
large employer mandate 
requirements are in fact injuring 
large employers such as the State. 
So the administration could find that its 
employer-mandate delay has the opposite of 
the desired effect. 
In sum, the administration threw everything 
it had at Liberty, but still couldn’t prevent 
Liberty University’s challenge to the 
employer mandate from reaching the merits. 
That’s very good for Pruitt, Halbig, and 
taxpayers, but very bad for Obamacare. 
 
 
